There’s a defense of bad preferences (not yet demonstrated in this article, but probably will be in the comments) along the lines of “You couldn’t really money pump me; I’d catch on after a round or two and quit talking to you.”
I think this fails, since there’s no reason that only one agent will try to turn you into a money pump once you are found to be vulnerable. If there’s a group of smart agents, they could engage you in a series of transactions over the course of years, taking your money all the while.
“You couldn’t really money pump me; I’d catch on after a round or two and quit talking to you.”
This brings up the fact that money pumps force you to act more like an expected utility maximiser, as long as you are aware of them and want to avoid them.
A more nuanced approach is to have some form of reflectivity that looks at whether you are losing money in general and tries to figure out if you are being money pumped or not (by a single person or group).
Great post!
There’s a defense of bad preferences (not yet demonstrated in this article, but probably will be in the comments) along the lines of “You couldn’t really money pump me; I’d catch on after a round or two and quit talking to you.”
I think this fails, since there’s no reason that only one agent will try to turn you into a money pump once you are found to be vulnerable. If there’s a group of smart agents, they could engage you in a series of transactions over the course of years, taking your money all the while.
This brings up the fact that money pumps force you to act more like an expected utility maximiser, as long as you are aware of them and want to avoid them.
A more nuanced approach is to have some form of reflectivity that looks at whether you are losing money in general and tries to figure out if you are being money pumped or not (by a single person or group).