I’m not an expert in traditional and modern virtue ethics, so my reply might be nonstandard. But in this case, I would simply note that the notion of virtue applies to others too—and the standards of behavior that are virtuous when applied towards decent people are not necessarily virtuous when applied to those who have overstepped certain boundaries.
Thus, for example, hospitality is a virtue, but for those who grossly abuse your hospitality, the virtuous thing to do is to throw them out of your house—and it’s a matter of practical wisdom to decide when this boundary has been overstepped. Similarly, non-aggression is also a virtue when dealing with honest people, but not when you catch a burglar in flagrante. In your example, the Nazis are coming with an extremely aggressive and hostile intent, and thus clearly place themselves beyond the pale of humanity, so that the virtuous thing to do is to oppose them in the most effective manner possible—which could mean deceiving them, considering that their physical power is overwhelming.
It seems to me that the real problems with virtue ethics are not that it mandates inflexibility in principles leading to crazy results—as far as I see, it doesn’t—but due to the fact that decisions requiring judgments of practical wisdom can be hard, non-obvious, and controversial. (At what exact point does someone’s behavior overstep the boundary to the point where it becomes virtuous to open hostilities in response?)
“Beyond the pale of humanity” is dubious stuff—there’s a big range between defensive lying and torturing prisoners, and quite a few ethicists would say that there are different rules for how you treat people who are directly dangerous to you and for how you treat people who can’t defend themselves from you.
I’m not an expert in traditional and modern virtue ethics, so my reply might be nonstandard. But in this case, I would simply note that the notion of virtue applies to others too—and the standards of behavior that are virtuous when applied towards decent people are not necessarily virtuous when applied to those who have overstepped certain boundaries.
Thus, for example, hospitality is a virtue, but for those who grossly abuse your hospitality, the virtuous thing to do is to throw them out of your house—and it’s a matter of practical wisdom to decide when this boundary has been overstepped. Similarly, non-aggression is also a virtue when dealing with honest people, but not when you catch a burglar in flagrante. In your example, the Nazis are coming with an extremely aggressive and hostile intent, and thus clearly place themselves beyond the pale of humanity, so that the virtuous thing to do is to oppose them in the most effective manner possible—which could mean deceiving them, considering that their physical power is overwhelming.
It seems to me that the real problems with virtue ethics are not that it mandates inflexibility in principles leading to crazy results—as far as I see, it doesn’t—but due to the fact that decisions requiring judgments of practical wisdom can be hard, non-obvious, and controversial. (At what exact point does someone’s behavior overstep the boundary to the point where it becomes virtuous to open hostilities in response?)
“Beyond the pale of humanity” is dubious stuff—there’s a big range between defensive lying and torturing prisoners, and quite a few ethicists would say that there are different rules for how you treat people who are directly dangerous to you and for how you treat people who can’t defend themselves from you.