Life is an insane gift and death is merely its absence.
An argument for afterlife
If believing in doom is too painful, I have a religion to sell to you. I might be able to convince you of an afterlife (for you and those you love).
My afterlife argument starts with a thought experiment. Suppose a teleportation machine destroyed you, but created an identical copy of you somewhere else. Would that copy be you? Should you anticipate the experiences of that new copy of you? I think most people would say yes. After all, your brain state continues to exist in the new copy.
Now suppose the teleportation machine doesn’t create a copy of you right now, but a copy of you from 1 second ago. Would you still anticipate the experiences of that new copy? I think most people will still say yes. What’s wrong with one second ago?
But what if it’s a copy of you from one year ago? Or a copy of you when you were a baby? At some point, the new copy will deviate from you so much that it won’t be you anymore, and you should not anticipate his/her future experiences, but anticipate death, the completely cessation of any experiences.
The fuzzy transition
For me, it starts to feel fuzzy, in between life and death, if the new copy deviates from me 10 years ago. I don’t know the exactly time period which feels the fuzziest to you, but try to imagine the time period where the copy of you is partially similar to you, and where you half anticipate experiencing his/her experiences.
Doesn’t that feel weird? “This person would be me, but only kind of me. If he/she has a happy life, I would kind of anticipate me having a happy life as him/her, but I would also kind of anticipate that’s just someone else having a happy life, and I meanwhile will be destroyed by the teleportation machine and experience nothing.”
So. What do you anticipate seeing after you walk into the teleportation machine? Dark nothingness? Or walking out the other side of the machine a little younger, with your memories erased, and very confused how you got there?
It’s fuzzy.
Looking for an objective answer
Given this fuzziness, you decide that before you walk into the machine, you will consult Reason to see if she will give you an objective answer for whether you will keep living, or become nothing.
But Reason is completely silent, and says not a word. Given the hypothesis where you keep existing, and keep experiencing life and all its joys as this new person, the configuration of atoms in the universe is exactly the same as the hypothesis where you cease to exist, and experience pure nothingness. The two hypotheses make the exact same predictions about the world, and Reason tells you that they are in fact the same hypothesis.
Reason might further tell you, that there is no such thing as “you-ness.” It is a meaningless attribute which exists only in your map and not the territory. Whether an entity has the attribute of “being you,” does not affect its behaviour in any way.
Whether an entity “is you,” only affects what experiences you anticipate. But there is no objectively correct answer for “what experience you should anticipate.” …which is insane if you think about it!
Anticipating experiences
After you absorb the shocking revelation and admit there is no objectively correct answer for “what experience you should anticipate,” Reason lets you observe the old Hermit of Immortality. The Hermit of Immortality lives in a cabin in the woods, and has never seen another soul. Every 100 years, he forgets all his memories, and gets a random personality change. The only way to recall his past, is to read his journal about his past life.
Reason tells you that his next transition is about to happen. You watch the Hermit grumble while writing on his journal. “Annoyingly, the time to forget my memories is soon approaching. It is a major annoyance, and my journal isn’t very organized this time, so after I forget my memories I will have a hard time studying it. Oh well, I’ll eventually figure it out. My life will eventually get simple and happy again after this brief confusing period, just like last time.”
The Hermit walks to a designated square outside his cabin, and you watch in horror as a massive box falls down from the sky and crushes him. A door opens on the side of a box, and a young man walks out.
Reason tells you that you may think the Hermit dies, while the Hermit thinks he merely forgets everything and gets a random personality change. But there is no objective law of nature to settle the dispute and prove who is right. The anticipation of experiences is a purely subjective matter.
Your choice
Reason tells you that it is completely your choice whether you anticipate pure nothingness after you die, or whether you anticipate someone else’s experiences just like the Hermit. The anticipation of experiences exists only in your map, not the territory. It is not even a belief which can be right or wrong, but a belief about belief, (or something akin to that).
Reason asks you, what do you choose?
You tell Reason, “I would rather choose nothingness, than to anticipate existence without my family who I love so much!”
Well, it seems you see them as a fundamental part of you. But why not anticipate your whole family, becoming some other whole family? That too, is allowed.
But don’t get too greedy. If you try to anticipate the experiences of the very happiest people, your intuition will find it less credible, and you will actually anticipate very little. Try to anticipate something a little bit more average.
Life is an insane gift and death is merely its absence.
An argument for afterlife
If believing in doom is too painful, I have a religion to sell to you. I might be able to convince you of an afterlife (for you and those you love).
My afterlife argument starts with a thought experiment. Suppose a teleportation machine destroyed you, but created an identical copy of you somewhere else. Would that copy be you? Should you anticipate the experiences of that new copy of you? I think most people would say yes. After all, your brain state continues to exist in the new copy.
Now suppose the teleportation machine doesn’t create a copy of you right now, but a copy of you from 1 second ago. Would you still anticipate the experiences of that new copy? I think most people will still say yes. What’s wrong with one second ago?
But what if it’s a copy of you from one year ago? Or a copy of you when you were a baby? At some point, the new copy will deviate from you so much that it won’t be you anymore, and you should not anticipate his/her future experiences, but anticipate death, the completely cessation of any experiences.
The fuzzy transition
For me, it starts to feel fuzzy, in between life and death, if the new copy deviates from me 10 years ago. I don’t know the exactly time period which feels the fuzziest to you, but try to imagine the time period where the copy of you is partially similar to you, and where you half anticipate experiencing his/her experiences.
Doesn’t that feel weird? “This person would be me, but only kind of me. If he/she has a happy life, I would kind of anticipate me having a happy life as him/her, but I would also kind of anticipate that’s just someone else having a happy life, and I meanwhile will be destroyed by the teleportation machine and experience nothing.”
So. What do you anticipate seeing after you walk into the teleportation machine? Dark nothingness? Or walking out the other side of the machine a little younger, with your memories erased, and very confused how you got there?
It’s fuzzy.
Looking for an objective answer
Given this fuzziness, you decide that before you walk into the machine, you will consult Reason to see if she will give you an objective answer for whether you will keep living, or become nothing.
But Reason is completely silent, and says not a word. Given the hypothesis where you keep existing, and keep experiencing life and all its joys as this new person, the configuration of atoms in the universe is exactly the same as the hypothesis where you cease to exist, and experience pure nothingness. The two hypotheses make the exact same predictions about the world, and Reason tells you that they are in fact the same hypothesis.
Reason might further tell you, that there is no such thing as “you-ness.” It is a meaningless attribute which exists only in your map and not the territory. Whether an entity has the attribute of “being you,” does not affect its behaviour in any way.
Whether an entity “is you,” only affects what experiences you anticipate. But there is no objectively correct answer for “what experience you should anticipate.” …which is insane if you think about it!
Anticipating experiences
After you absorb the shocking revelation and admit there is no objectively correct answer for “what experience you should anticipate,” Reason lets you observe the old Hermit of Immortality. The Hermit of Immortality lives in a cabin in the woods, and has never seen another soul. Every 100 years, he forgets all his memories, and gets a random personality change. The only way to recall his past, is to read his journal about his past life.
Reason tells you that his next transition is about to happen. You watch the Hermit grumble while writing on his journal. “Annoyingly, the time to forget my memories is soon approaching. It is a major annoyance, and my journal isn’t very organized this time, so after I forget my memories I will have a hard time studying it. Oh well, I’ll eventually figure it out. My life will eventually get simple and happy again after this brief confusing period, just like last time.”
The Hermit walks to a designated square outside his cabin, and you watch in horror as a massive box falls down from the sky and crushes him. A door opens on the side of a box, and a young man walks out.
Reason tells you that you may think the Hermit dies, while the Hermit thinks he merely forgets everything and gets a random personality change. But there is no objective law of nature to settle the dispute and prove who is right. The anticipation of experiences is a purely subjective matter.
Your choice
Reason tells you that it is completely your choice whether you anticipate pure nothingness after you die, or whether you anticipate someone else’s experiences just like the Hermit. The anticipation of experiences exists only in your map, not the territory. It is not even a belief which can be right or wrong, but a belief about belief, (or something akin to that).
Reason asks you, what do you choose?
You tell Reason, “I would rather choose nothingness, than to anticipate existence without my family who I love so much!”
Well, it seems you see them as a fundamental part of you. But why not anticipate your whole family, becoming some other whole family? That too, is allowed.
But don’t get too greedy. If you try to anticipate the experiences of the very happiest people, your intuition will find it less credible, and you will actually anticipate very little. Try to anticipate something a little bit more average.
Fin
What do you think about my pseudoreligion? :)