The first argument is simply outright false. If you believe in free will, you will act differently from someone who does not believe in free will in at least some circumstances. So in contrast you what you propose, something would change.
You will act differently in discussions about free will but I haven’t seen any evidence that it correlates with behavior in other contexts.
I guess it would depend on how exactly one “believes in free will” or “disbelieves in free will”. That is, what exactly is their model of a human mind (including their own).
This may result in specific behaviors, for example a “believer in free will” may generally try to overcome their problems using willpower, while a “disbeliever in free will” may generally try to modify their behavior indirectly by modifying their environment. With regard to others, a “believer in free will” may try to convince them verbally, while a “disbeliever in free will” may try to set up incentives.
Of course, people can be inconsistent. One can profess disbelief in free will, and yet try to solve their problems using (nonexistent, according to their worldview) willpower. I would actually expect most “disbelievers in free will” to make this mistake.
Ironically, this interpretation contradicts the author’s conclusion:
In a nutshell, I state that believing FW is just more optimal. (for most people)
You will act differently in discussions about free will but I haven’t seen any evidence that it correlates with behavior in other contexts.
I guess it would depend on how exactly one “believes in free will” or “disbelieves in free will”. That is, what exactly is their model of a human mind (including their own).
This may result in specific behaviors, for example a “believer in free will” may generally try to overcome their problems using willpower, while a “disbeliever in free will” may generally try to modify their behavior indirectly by modifying their environment. With regard to others, a “believer in free will” may try to convince them verbally, while a “disbeliever in free will” may try to set up incentives.
Of course, people can be inconsistent. One can profess disbelief in free will, and yet try to solve their problems using (nonexistent, according to their worldview) willpower. I would actually expect most “disbelievers in free will” to make this mistake.
Ironically, this interpretation contradicts the author’s conclusion:
I expect that in most cases people’s philosophical beliefs on will power are fairly sandboxed from practical concerns.