Autarchies, including China, seem more likely to reconfigure their entire economic and social systems overnight than democracies like the US, so this seems false.
It’s often very costly to do so—for example, ending the zero covid policy was very politically costly even though it was the right thing to do. Also, most major reconfigurations even for autocratic countries probably mostly happen right after there is a transition of power (for China, Mao is kind of an exception, but thats because he had so much power that it was impossible to challenge his authority even when he messed up).
The closing off of China after/during Tinamen square I don’t think happened after a transition of power, though I could be mis-remembering. See also the one-child policy, which I also don’t think happened during a power transition (allowed for 2 children in 2015, then removed all limits in 2021, while Xi came to power in 2012).
I agree the zero-covid policy change ended up being slow. I don’t know why it was slow though, I know a popular narrative is that the regime didn’t want to lose face, but one fact about China is the reason why many decisions are made is highly obscured. It seems entirely possible to me there were groups (possibly consisting of Xi himself) who believed zero-covid was smart. I don’t know much about this though.
I will also say this is one example of china being abnormally slow of many examples of them being abnormally fast, and I think the abnormally fast examples win out overall.
Mao is kind of an exception, but thats because he had so much power that it was impossible to challenge his authority even when he messed up
Ish? The reason he pursued the cultural revolution was because people were starting to question his power, after the great leap forward, but yeah he could be an outlier. I do think that many autocracies are governed by charismatic & powerful leaders though, so not that much an outlier.
I mean, the proximate cause of the 1989 protests was the death of the quite reformist general secretary Hu Yaobang. The new general secretary, Zhao Ziyang, was very sympathetic towards the protesters and wanted to negotiate with them, but then he lost a power struggle against Li Peng and Deng Xiaoping (who was in semi retirement but still held onto control of the military). Immediately afterwards, he was removed as general secretary and martial law was declared, leading to the massacre.
Autarchies, including China, seem more likely to reconfigure their entire economic and social systems overnight than democracies like the US, so this seems false.
It’s often very costly to do so—for example, ending the zero covid policy was very politically costly even though it was the right thing to do. Also, most major reconfigurations even for autocratic countries probably mostly happen right after there is a transition of power (for China, Mao is kind of an exception, but thats because he had so much power that it was impossible to challenge his authority even when he messed up).
The closing off of China after/during Tinamen square I don’t think happened after a transition of power, though I could be mis-remembering. See also the one-child policy, which I also don’t think happened during a power transition (allowed for 2 children in 2015, then removed all limits in 2021, while Xi came to power in 2012).
I agree the zero-covid policy change ended up being slow. I don’t know why it was slow though, I know a popular narrative is that the regime didn’t want to lose face, but one fact about China is the reason why many decisions are made is highly obscured. It seems entirely possible to me there were groups (possibly consisting of Xi himself) who believed zero-covid was smart. I don’t know much about this though.
I will also say this is one example of china being abnormally slow of many examples of them being abnormally fast, and I think the abnormally fast examples win out overall.
Ish? The reason he pursued the cultural revolution was because people were starting to question his power, after the great leap forward, but yeah he could be an outlier. I do think that many autocracies are governed by charismatic & powerful leaders though, so not that much an outlier.
I mean, the proximate cause of the 1989 protests was the death of the quite reformist general secretary Hu Yaobang. The new general secretary, Zhao Ziyang, was very sympathetic towards the protesters and wanted to negotiate with them, but then he lost a power struggle against Li Peng and Deng Xiaoping (who was in semi retirement but still held onto control of the military). Immediately afterwards, he was removed as general secretary and martial law was declared, leading to the massacre.