I’m not sure if we’re interested in the same stuff. But taking up one topic:
I think you regard innate/genetic ideas as important. I do not. Because people are universal knowledge creators, and can change any idea they start with, it doesn’t matter very much.
The reason people are so biased is not in their genes but their memes.
There are two major replication strategies that memes use.
1) a meme can be useful and rational. it spreads because of its value
2) a meme can sabotage its holders creativity to prevent him from criticizing it, and to take away his choice not to spread it
The second type dominated all cultures on Earth for a long time. The transition to the first type is incomplete.
More details one memes and universality can be found in The Beginning of Infinity by David Deutsch
I think you regard innate/genetic ideas as important. I do not. Because people are universal knowledge creators, and can change any idea they start with, it doesn’t matter very much.
You misunderstand. I bring it up as a model of learning, and my choice was based on your own remarks. You said that knowledge is created by an evolutionary process. That way of putting it suggests an analogy with Darwin’s theory of evolution as proceeding by random variation and natural selection. And indeed there is an analogy between Popper’s conjectures and refutations and variation and natural selection, and it is this: a conjecture is something like variation (mutation), and refutation is something like natural selection.
However, what I found was that the closer I looked at knowledge which is actually acquired through natural selection—what we might call innate knowledge or instinctive knowledge—the more the process of acquisition resembled Bayesian updating rather than Popperian conjecture and refutation. I explained why.
In Bayesian updating, there are competing hypotheses, and the one for which actual events are less of a surprise (i.e., the hypothesis Hi for which P(E|Hi) is higher) is strengthened relative to the one for which events are more of a surprise. I find a parallel to this in competition among alleles under natural selection, which I described.
Essential to Bayesian updating is the coexistence of competing hypotheses, and essential to natural selection is the coexistence of competing variants in a species. In contrast, Popper talks about conjecture and refutation, which is a more lonely process that need not involve more than one conjecture and a set of observations which have the potential to falsify it. Popper talks about improving the conjecture in response to refutation, but this process more resembles Lamarckian evolution than Darwinian evolution, because in Lamarckian evolution the individuals improve themselves in response to environmental challenges, much as Popper would have us improve our conjectures in response to observational challenges. Also, in Lamarckian evolution, as in the Popperian process of conjecture and refutation, competing variants (compare: competing hypotheses) do not play an essential role (though I’m sure they could be introduced). Rather, the picture is of a single animal (compare: a single hypothesis) facing existential environmental challenges (compare: facing the potential for falsification) improving itself in response (which improvement is passed to offspring).
The Popperian process of conjecture, refutation, and improvement of the conjecture, can as it happens be understood from a Bayesian standpoint. It does implement Bayesian updating in a certain way. Specifically, when a particular conjecture is refuted and the scientist modifies the conjecture—at that point, there are two competing hypotheses. So at that point, the process of choosing between these two competing hypotheses can be characterized as Bayesian updating. The less successful hypothesis is weakened, and the more successful hypothesis is strengthened.
In short, if you want to take seriously the analogy that does exist between evolution through natural selection and knowledge acquisition of whatever type, then you may want to take a closer look at Bayesian updating as conforming more closely to the Darwinian model.
You said we were discussing an analogy. That was a mistake. How can having made a mistake strength your argument? When you make a mistake, and find out, you should be like “uh oh. maybe i made 2. or 3. i better rethink things a bit more carefully. maybe the mistake is caused by a misunderstanding that could cause multiple mistakes.” I don’t think glossing over mistakes is rational or wise.
Because if there is only an analogy between evolution and knowledge acquisition, there are some aspects of each that do are not the same, and it is possible that these differences mean that the specific factor under consideration is not the same; but if the two processes are literally the same, that is not possible.
“How can having a mistake strengthen your argument?”
Example: During WWII,many American leaders didn’t believe that Germany was actually committing massacres, as they were disillusioned from similar but inaccurate WWI propaganda; however, they still believed that Nazi aggression was morally wrong. Later, the death camps were discovered. Clearly, given that they were mistaken in disbelieving in the Holocaust, they were mistaken in believing that the Nazis were morally wrong- because how can making a mistake strength your argument?
Your defects would be easier to tolerate if you were less arrogant. A bit of humility would go a long way to keeping the conversation going. My guess is that you picked up your approach because it led to your being the last person standing, winning by attrition—when in reality the other participants were simply too disgusted to continue.
I’m not sure if we’re interested in the same stuff. But taking up one topic:
I think you regard innate/genetic ideas as important. I do not. Because people are universal knowledge creators, and can change any idea they start with, it doesn’t matter very much.
The reason people are so biased is not in their genes but their memes.
There are two major replication strategies that memes use.
1) a meme can be useful and rational. it spreads because of its value
2) a meme can sabotage its holders creativity to prevent him from criticizing it, and to take away his choice not to spread it
The second type dominated all cultures on Earth for a long time. The transition to the first type is incomplete.
More details one memes and universality can be found in The Beginning of Infinity by David Deutsch
You misunderstand. I bring it up as a model of learning, and my choice was based on your own remarks. You said that knowledge is created by an evolutionary process. That way of putting it suggests an analogy with Darwin’s theory of evolution as proceeding by random variation and natural selection. And indeed there is an analogy between Popper’s conjectures and refutations and variation and natural selection, and it is this: a conjecture is something like variation (mutation), and refutation is something like natural selection.
However, what I found was that the closer I looked at knowledge which is actually acquired through natural selection—what we might call innate knowledge or instinctive knowledge—the more the process of acquisition resembled Bayesian updating rather than Popperian conjecture and refutation. I explained why.
In Bayesian updating, there are competing hypotheses, and the one for which actual events are less of a surprise (i.e., the hypothesis Hi for which P(E|Hi) is higher) is strengthened relative to the one for which events are more of a surprise. I find a parallel to this in competition among alleles under natural selection, which I described.
Essential to Bayesian updating is the coexistence of competing hypotheses, and essential to natural selection is the coexistence of competing variants in a species. In contrast, Popper talks about conjecture and refutation, which is a more lonely process that need not involve more than one conjecture and a set of observations which have the potential to falsify it. Popper talks about improving the conjecture in response to refutation, but this process more resembles Lamarckian evolution than Darwinian evolution, because in Lamarckian evolution the individuals improve themselves in response to environmental challenges, much as Popper would have us improve our conjectures in response to observational challenges. Also, in Lamarckian evolution, as in the Popperian process of conjecture and refutation, competing variants (compare: competing hypotheses) do not play an essential role (though I’m sure they could be introduced). Rather, the picture is of a single animal (compare: a single hypothesis) facing existential environmental challenges (compare: facing the potential for falsification) improving itself in response (which improvement is passed to offspring).
The Popperian process of conjecture, refutation, and improvement of the conjecture, can as it happens be understood from a Bayesian standpoint. It does implement Bayesian updating in a certain way. Specifically, when a particular conjecture is refuted and the scientist modifies the conjecture—at that point, there are two competing hypotheses. So at that point, the process of choosing between these two competing hypotheses can be characterized as Bayesian updating. The less successful hypothesis is weakened, and the more successful hypothesis is strengthened.
In short, if you want to take seriously the analogy that does exist between evolution through natural selection and knowledge acquisition of whatever type, then you may want to take a closer look at Bayesian updating as conforming more closely to the Darwinian model.
I wasn’t talking about an analogy.
Evolution is a theory which applies to any type of replicator. Not by analogy by literally applies.
Make sense so far?
That only strengthens my argument.
You said we were discussing an analogy. That was a mistake. How can having made a mistake strength your argument? When you make a mistake, and find out, you should be like “uh oh. maybe i made 2. or 3. i better rethink things a bit more carefully. maybe the mistake is caused by a misunderstanding that could cause multiple mistakes.” I don’t think glossing over mistakes is rational or wise.
Make sense so far?
Because if there is only an analogy between evolution and knowledge acquisition, there are some aspects of each that do are not the same, and it is possible that these differences mean that the specific factor under consideration is not the same; but if the two processes are literally the same, that is not possible.
“How can having a mistake strengthen your argument?”
Example: During WWII,many American leaders didn’t believe that Germany was actually committing massacres, as they were disillusioned from similar but inaccurate WWI propaganda; however, they still believed that Nazi aggression was morally wrong. Later, the death camps were discovered. Clearly, given that they were mistaken in disbelieving in the Holocaust, they were mistaken in believing that the Nazis were morally wrong- because how can making a mistake strength your argument?
Your defects would be easier to tolerate if you were less arrogant. A bit of humility would go a long way to keeping the conversation going. My guess is that you picked up your approach because it led to your being the last person standing, winning by attrition—when in reality the other participants were simply too disgusted to continue.