Imagine that I have some set of propositions, A through Z, and I don’t know the probabilities of any of these. Now let’s say I’m using these propositions to explain some experimental result—since I would have uniform priors for A through Z, it follows that an explanation like “M did it” is more probable than “A and B did it,” which in turn is more probable than “G and P and H did it.”
Yes, I agree with you there. But this is much weaker than any general form of Occam. See my example with primes. What we want to say in some form of Occam approach is much stronger than what you can get from simply using the conjunction argument.
Imagine that I have some set of propositions, A through Z, and I don’t know the probabilities of any of these. Now let’s say I’m using these propositions to explain some experimental result—since I would have uniform priors for A through Z, it follows that an explanation like “M did it” is more probable than “A and B did it,” which in turn is more probable than “G and P and H did it.”
Yes, I agree with you there. But this is much weaker than any general form of Occam. See my example with primes. What we want to say in some form of Occam approach is much stronger than what you can get from simply using the conjunction argument.