As I tried to say (and probably explained really poorly- sorry!), the LW consensus is that morality is not objective. Therefore, the idea of figuring out what good moral values would be is, according to moral non-realism, impossible: any decision about what a good moral value is must rely on your pre-existing values, if an objective morality is not out there to be discovered. Using this as a criticism of Bayesianism is sorta like criticizing thermodynamics because it claims it’s impossible to exactly specify the position and velocity of each particle: not only is the criticism unrelated to the subject matter, but satisfying it would require the theory to do something that is to the best of our knowledge incorrect.
As I tried to say (and probably explained really poorly- sorry!), the LW consensus is that morality is not objective. Therefore, the idea of figuring out what good moral values would be is, according to moral non-realism, impossible: any decision about what a good moral value is must rely on your pre-existing values, if an objective morality is not out there to be discovered. Using this as a criticism of Bayesianism is sorta like criticizing thermodynamics because it claims it’s impossible to exactly specify the position and velocity of each particle: not only is the criticism unrelated to the subject matter, but satisfying it would require the theory to do something that is to the best of our knowledge incorrect.