That’s not really what Popperian epistemology is about. But also: the concept of evidence for theories is a mistake that doesn’t actually make sense, as Popper explained. If you doubt this, do what no one else on this site has yet managed: tell me what “support” means (like in the phrase “supporting evidence”) and tell me how support differs from consistency.
I’ve read his arguments for this, I simply wasn’t convinced that accepting it in any way improved scientific conduct.
“Support” would be data in light of which the subjective likelihood of a hypothesis is increased. If consistency does not meaningfully differ from this with respect to how we respond to data, can you explain why it is is more practical to think about data in terms of consistency than support?
I’d also like to add that I do know what justificationism is, and your tendency to openly assume deficiencies in the knowledge of others is rather irritating. I normally wouldn’t bother to remark upon it, but given that you posed a superior grasp of socially effective debate conduct as evidence of the strength of your epistemology, I feel the need to point out that I don’t feel like you’re meeting the standards of etiquette I would expect of most members of Less Wrong.
I’ve read his arguments for this, I simply wasn’t convinced that accepting it in any way improved scientific conduct.
Yet again you disagree with no substantive argument. If you don’t have anything to say, why are you posting?
can you explain why it is is more practical to think about data in terms of consistency than support?
Well, consistency is good as far as it goes. If we see 10 white swans, we should reject “all swans are black” (yes, even this much depends on some other stuff). Consistency does the job without anything extraneous or misleading.
The support idea claims that sometimes evidence supports one idea it is consistent with more than another. This isn’t true, except in special cases which aren’t important.
The way Popper improves on this is by noting that there are always many hypotheses consistent with the data. Saying their likelihood increases is pointless. It does not help deal with the problem of differentiating between them. Something else, not support, is needed. This leaves the concept of support with nothing useful to do, except be badly abused in sloppy arguments (I have in mind arguments I’ve seen elsewhere. Lots of them. What people do is they find some evidence, and some theory it is consistent with, and they say the theory is supported so now they have a strong argument or whatever. And they are totally selective about this. You try to tell them, “well, theory is also consistent with the data. so it’s supported just as much. right?” and they say no, theirs fits the data better, so it’s supported more. but you ask what the difference is, and they can’t tell you because there is no answer. the idea that a theory can fit the data better than another, when both are consistent with the data, is a mistake (again there are some special cases that don’t matter in practice).)
The support idea claims that sometimes evidence supports one idea it is consistent with more than another. This isn’t true, except in special cases which aren’t important.
Suppose I ask a woman if she has children. She says no.
This is supporting evidence for the hypothesis that she does not have children; it raises the likelihood from my perspective that she is childless.
It is entirely consistent with the hypothesis that she has children; she would simply have to be lying.
So it appears to me that in this case, whatever arguments you might make regarding induction, viewing the data in terms of consistency does not inform my behavior as well.
This is the standard story. It is nothing but an appeal to intuition (and/or unstated background knowledge, unstated explanations, unstated assumptions, etc). There is no argument for it and there never has been one.
Refuting this common mistake is something important Popper did.
Try reading your post again. You simply assumed that her having children is more likely. That is not true from the example presented, without some unstated assumptions being added. There is no argument in your post. That makes it very difficult to argue against because there’s nothing to engage with.
It could go either way. You know it could go either way. You claim one way fits the data better, but you don’t offer any rigorous guidelines (or anything else) for figuring out which way fits better. What are the rules to decide which consistent theories are more supported than others?
Of course it could go either way. But if I behaved in everyday life as if it were equally likely to go either way, I would be subjecting myself to disaster. For practical purposes it has always served me better to accept that certain hypotheses that are consistent with the available data are more probable than others, and while I cannot prove that this makes it more likely that it will continue to do so in the future, I’m willing to bet quite heavily that it will.
If Popper’s epistemology does not lead to superior results to induction, and at best, only reduces to procedures that perform as well, then I do not see why I should regard his refutation of induction as important.
I’ve read his arguments for this, I simply wasn’t convinced that accepting it in any way improved scientific conduct.
“Support” would be data in light of which the subjective likelihood of a hypothesis is increased. If consistency does not meaningfully differ from this with respect to how we respond to data, can you explain why it is is more practical to think about data in terms of consistency than support?
I’d also like to add that I do know what justificationism is, and your tendency to openly assume deficiencies in the knowledge of others is rather irritating. I normally wouldn’t bother to remark upon it, but given that you posed a superior grasp of socially effective debate conduct as evidence of the strength of your epistemology, I feel the need to point out that I don’t feel like you’re meeting the standards of etiquette I would expect of most members of Less Wrong.
Yet again you disagree with no substantive argument. If you don’t have anything to say, why are you posting?
Well, consistency is good as far as it goes. If we see 10 white swans, we should reject “all swans are black” (yes, even this much depends on some other stuff). Consistency does the job without anything extraneous or misleading.
The support idea claims that sometimes evidence supports one idea it is consistent with more than another. This isn’t true, except in special cases which aren’t important.
The way Popper improves on this is by noting that there are always many hypotheses consistent with the data. Saying their likelihood increases is pointless. It does not help deal with the problem of differentiating between them. Something else, not support, is needed. This leaves the concept of support with nothing useful to do, except be badly abused in sloppy arguments (I have in mind arguments I’ve seen elsewhere. Lots of them. What people do is they find some evidence, and some theory it is consistent with, and they say the theory is supported so now they have a strong argument or whatever. And they are totally selective about this. You try to tell them, “well, theory is also consistent with the data. so it’s supported just as much. right?” and they say no, theirs fits the data better, so it’s supported more. but you ask what the difference is, and they can’t tell you because there is no answer. the idea that a theory can fit the data better than another, when both are consistent with the data, is a mistake (again there are some special cases that don’t matter in practice).)
Suppose I ask a woman if she has children. She says no.
This is supporting evidence for the hypothesis that she does not have children; it raises the likelihood from my perspective that she is childless.
It is entirely consistent with the hypothesis that she has children; she would simply have to be lying.
So it appears to me that in this case, whatever arguments you might make regarding induction, viewing the data in terms of consistency does not inform my behavior as well.
This is the standard story. It is nothing but an appeal to intuition (and/or unstated background knowledge, unstated explanations, unstated assumptions, etc). There is no argument for it and there never has been one.
Refuting this common mistake is something important Popper did.
Try reading your post again. You simply assumed that her having children is more likely. That is not true from the example presented, without some unstated assumptions being added. There is no argument in your post. That makes it very difficult to argue against because there’s nothing to engage with.
It could go either way. You know it could go either way. You claim one way fits the data better, but you don’t offer any rigorous guidelines (or anything else) for figuring out which way fits better. What are the rules to decide which consistent theories are more supported than others?
Of course it could go either way. But if I behaved in everyday life as if it were equally likely to go either way, I would be subjecting myself to disaster. For practical purposes it has always served me better to accept that certain hypotheses that are consistent with the available data are more probable than others, and while I cannot prove that this makes it more likely that it will continue to do so in the future, I’m willing to bet quite heavily that it will.
If Popper’s epistemology does not lead to superior results to induction, and at best, only reduces to procedures that perform as well, then I do not see why I should regard his refutation of induction as important.