Transparent Newcomb … you can go against the prediction, e.g. one box if it’s empty and two box if they both are full. What Omega offers to those guys, huh?
The situation doesn’t exist for them, as a logical result of their behavior. They also don’t win.
XOR blackmail … There is no way to act on this information and get out of bounds of what is postulated.
The bounds of what is postulated can’t constrain what an algorithm actually does, even when the algorithm gets to know what was postulated in some sense, and is correct in that knowledge in some sense. The algorithm is still the only thing that determines the algorithm’s behavior, it screens off everything else. No other claims or predictions or stipulations get to determine the algorithm’s behavior. It gets to refute even a formal proof about what it does, causing the whole situation where that proof was present or stipulated to never have existed, even if it’s the whole world. The selection effect has no power over the behavior that the abstract algorithm chooses.
You can explicitly say what happens if you are not in selection, I guess. Like “Omega takes a look at you from stealth. If it thinks you would not say banana if given $100 and explanation of the setup, it approaches you and does it. Otherwise it leaves without turning off stealth or explaining anything”—then everyone is in selection again.
I think XOR problem is of this type. Smokers lesion deals with this incorrectly / underdefined. Transparent boxes Newcomb’s can be fixed in the same way. Although I think the one fixed with counterfactual predictor is better as a problem, although is a different one.
The situation doesn’t exist for them, as a logical result of their behavior. They also don’t win.
The bounds of what is postulated can’t constrain what an algorithm actually does, even when the algorithm gets to know what was postulated in some sense, and is correct in that knowledge in some sense. The algorithm is still the only thing that determines the algorithm’s behavior, it screens off everything else. No other claims or predictions or stipulations get to determine the algorithm’s behavior. It gets to refute even a formal proof about what it does, causing the whole situation where that proof was present or stipulated to never have existed, even if it’s the whole world. The selection effect has no power over the behavior that the abstract algorithm chooses.
You can explicitly say what happens if you are not in selection, I guess. Like “Omega takes a look at you from stealth. If it thinks you would not say banana if given $100 and explanation of the setup, it approaches you and does it. Otherwise it leaves without turning off stealth or explaining anything”—then everyone is in selection again.
I think XOR problem is of this type. Smokers lesion deals with this incorrectly / underdefined. Transparent boxes Newcomb’s can be fixed in the same way. Although I think the one fixed with counterfactual predictor is better as a problem, although is a different one.