Excellent post overall. I want to comment on one interesting bit. Zvi describes the “asymmetric” system as having this feature, among others:
Some of the indirect consequences of buying a tomato are good. You don’t get credit for those unless you knew about them, because all you were trying to do was buy a tomato. Knowing about them is possible in theory, but expensive, and doesn’t make them better. It only makes you know about them, which only matters to the extent that it changes your decisions.
It’s worth asking: should we (who would like to improve the system) reject this aspect, in particular? That is: should people get “moral credit” for indirect, good consequences of their actions (even when they are unlikely to have known about them)?
I say: yes.
I can see two reasons for taking this view.
First, even if you didn’t know about a negative, indirect consequence of one of your actions, you should incur moral blame for it (not necessarily much moral blame, but some—scaled by just how indirect the consequence was, etc.), because you could have known about the negative consequences—and we would not wish to let you off the hook in that case, merely due to plausible deniability (as that would incentivize people to not know, or appear not to know, about the indirect bad consequences of their actions). Similarly, you should gain moral credit for positive indirect consequences of your actions, because you could have known—and we would not wish to deprive you of the moral credit for knowingly doing something with that good consequence, merely due to un-provability of foreknowledge (as that would fail to incentivize people to learn of the good effects their actions have).
Second, we generally say that you should have known of the indirect bad consequences of your actions, and we assign moral blame on that basis, because otherwise we fail to disincentivize engaging in activities with bad indirect consequences, and participating in destructive systems. Similarly, by assigning moral credit to the indirect good consequences of your actions, we reward (and thus incentivize) engaging in beneficial activities and participating in beneficial systems. (As a bonus benefit, we also thus incentivize the construction of beneficial systems, if people who participate in them gain moral credit thereby even if they are unaware of some of those systems’ benefits.)
Excellent post overall. I want to comment on one interesting bit. Zvi describes the “asymmetric” system as having this feature, among others:
It’s worth asking: should we (who would like to improve the system) reject this aspect, in particular? That is: should people get “moral credit” for indirect, good consequences of their actions (even when they are unlikely to have known about them)?
I say: yes.
I can see two reasons for taking this view.
First, even if you didn’t know about a negative, indirect consequence of one of your actions, you should incur moral blame for it (not necessarily much moral blame, but some—scaled by just how indirect the consequence was, etc.), because you could have known about the negative consequences—and we would not wish to let you off the hook in that case, merely due to plausible deniability (as that would incentivize people to not know, or appear not to know, about the indirect bad consequences of their actions). Similarly, you should gain moral credit for positive indirect consequences of your actions, because you could have known—and we would not wish to deprive you of the moral credit for knowingly doing something with that good consequence, merely due to un-provability of foreknowledge (as that would fail to incentivize people to learn of the good effects their actions have).
Second, we generally say that you should have known of the indirect bad consequences of your actions, and we assign moral blame on that basis, because otherwise we fail to disincentivize engaging in activities with bad indirect consequences, and participating in destructive systems. Similarly, by assigning moral credit to the indirect good consequences of your actions, we reward (and thus incentivize) engaging in beneficial activities and participating in beneficial systems. (As a bonus benefit, we also thus incentivize the construction of beneficial systems, if people who participate in them gain moral credit thereby even if they are unaware of some of those systems’ benefits.)