Good answers have been given by commenters already, so I’ll take a second to say: this reminds me strongly of C.S. Lewis’ dissertation on miracles. Titled, can you believe it, Miracles.
I don’t remember the entire discussion, but his opening expressed an idea of priors similar to what you’ve outlined here: those who review history looking for miracles will find evidence for them. Those who review history looking for evidence against miracles will find it. His idea was, simplified, “If a miracle occured, a person who does not believe in miracles would accept the evidence as being of an unexplained phenomena that more study will reveal. So, even if I were to raise the dead before your eyes, it would not constitute proof of a miracle to you unless you already accepted the idea that miracles can occur.”
I… did not like this thesis. Now, I read this after my own falling out with Christianity, but I still had (and still have) a deep respect for Lewis. But this thesis reminded me very much of the argument made by creationists about how world views determine your interpretation of scientific fact. When laid over the field of paleontology, the idea starts to show its flaws. In geology, if you determine a rock is a million years old, you can’t “interpret” that fact to mean it only looks a million but is actually a thousand years old. That’s doublethink: the rock “is” a million years old (by looks) but actually “is” (by essence) a thousand. You’re saying the evidence suggests two things: what the rock “looks” like (according to the evidence of your senses) and what the rock “is” (according to the evidence of your senses on the matter of religion).
I feel that Lewis’ argument on miracles and priors relies on the same sort of difficulty. An event “is” (by looks) a miracle and either “is” (by essence) really or not really a miracle. That tells us nothing. The phenomena is or is not a miracle. Your priors don’t matter. If Horus really did return from Hell, my disbelief can do nothing to change that fact. Horus’ death and return, as real events, guarantee a world that physically resembles and acts like one where Horus’ death and return did happen, not one where they did not happen. So the evidence can only mean one thing, not either depending on my priors.
So, all of this is to say, “miracles” are not different from other phenomena. They are not a special class. You judge a miracle (or report of a miracle) the exact same way you judge a rock. If I walked into my office tomorrow morning and found a large rock had appeared there overnight, I would use the same senses and tools to determine where it had come from as I would if it were the second incarnation of Christ. Neither event has a special set of circumstances regarding how I gather or consider its evidence. I still have to judge the second incarnation of Christ by sight, sound, smell, touch, etc and the evidence I gather is still subject to the same scrutiny and consideration as if it Christ were a rock.
Glad you decided to open up about this difficulty. As one raised Christian (you are obviously among fellows here), I can appreciate the power of Belief. This is not an easy issue to face, however you end up updating your beliefs. Good luck.
Isn’t Lewis’ argument in that case actually standard probability theory? If you hold a prior of 0 for an event, no finite amount of evidence will change your mind. Miracles aren’t a special class-everything is judged by both priors and evidence. Lewis wasn’t arguing for a separate magisterium or some other case of special pleading, he was saying that there exists enough evidence to convince us miracles have occured unless our prior is 0 or extremely low. The rest of Miracles was devoted to arguing that our prior shouldn’t be especially low.
Hmm, that’s not a bad observation. I still find myself regarding it as an unconvincing argument, but my useful understanding of probability theory is too low to provide a structured reasoning. As I don’t want to argue a point I’m weak on just to signal that I stand apart from Lewis’ beliefs, I’ll accept your point. Thanks.
Good answers have been given by commenters already, so I’ll take a second to say: this reminds me strongly of C.S. Lewis’ dissertation on miracles. Titled, can you believe it, Miracles.
I don’t remember the entire discussion, but his opening expressed an idea of priors similar to what you’ve outlined here: those who review history looking for miracles will find evidence for them. Those who review history looking for evidence against miracles will find it. His idea was, simplified, “If a miracle occured, a person who does not believe in miracles would accept the evidence as being of an unexplained phenomena that more study will reveal. So, even if I were to raise the dead before your eyes, it would not constitute proof of a miracle to you unless you already accepted the idea that miracles can occur.”
I… did not like this thesis. Now, I read this after my own falling out with Christianity, but I still had (and still have) a deep respect for Lewis. But this thesis reminded me very much of the argument made by creationists about how world views determine your interpretation of scientific fact. When laid over the field of paleontology, the idea starts to show its flaws. In geology, if you determine a rock is a million years old, you can’t “interpret” that fact to mean it only looks a million but is actually a thousand years old. That’s doublethink: the rock “is” a million years old (by looks) but actually “is” (by essence) a thousand. You’re saying the evidence suggests two things: what the rock “looks” like (according to the evidence of your senses) and what the rock “is” (according to the evidence of your senses on the matter of religion).
I feel that Lewis’ argument on miracles and priors relies on the same sort of difficulty. An event “is” (by looks) a miracle and either “is” (by essence) really or not really a miracle. That tells us nothing. The phenomena is or is not a miracle. Your priors don’t matter. If Horus really did return from Hell, my disbelief can do nothing to change that fact. Horus’ death and return, as real events, guarantee a world that physically resembles and acts like one where Horus’ death and return did happen, not one where they did not happen. So the evidence can only mean one thing, not either depending on my priors.
So, all of this is to say, “miracles” are not different from other phenomena. They are not a special class. You judge a miracle (or report of a miracle) the exact same way you judge a rock. If I walked into my office tomorrow morning and found a large rock had appeared there overnight, I would use the same senses and tools to determine where it had come from as I would if it were the second incarnation of Christ. Neither event has a special set of circumstances regarding how I gather or consider its evidence. I still have to judge the second incarnation of Christ by sight, sound, smell, touch, etc and the evidence I gather is still subject to the same scrutiny and consideration as if it Christ were a rock.
Glad you decided to open up about this difficulty. As one raised Christian (you are obviously among fellows here), I can appreciate the power of Belief. This is not an easy issue to face, however you end up updating your beliefs. Good luck.
Isn’t Lewis’ argument in that case actually standard probability theory? If you hold a prior of 0 for an event, no finite amount of evidence will change your mind. Miracles aren’t a special class-everything is judged by both priors and evidence. Lewis wasn’t arguing for a separate magisterium or some other case of special pleading, he was saying that there exists enough evidence to convince us miracles have occured unless our prior is 0 or extremely low. The rest of Miracles was devoted to arguing that our prior shouldn’t be especially low.
Hmm, that’s not a bad observation. I still find myself regarding it as an unconvincing argument, but my useful understanding of probability theory is too low to provide a structured reasoning. As I don’t want to argue a point I’m weak on just to signal that I stand apart from Lewis’ beliefs, I’ll accept your point. Thanks.