Mm… the principle of “just because something is a good thing does not mean that it is a ‘rationalist’ thing” is of course entirely correct. The question is just what qualifies some skill as a “rationalist” skill.
I think this is a good question, and also it verges on “what is the full list of rationalist skills or at least a ” which seems a bit big for this particular comment section. I think spotting lies and more general manipulation and deceit is pretty centrally a rationalist skill.
No argument there.
If we take “rationalist skill” to mean only such skills as are somehow “meta” or apply to the development and practice of techniques of rationality, then my reason #2 should not convince us that lying is a rationalist skill.
And that seems self-referential. Hockey skills are the ones that apply to the practice of techniques of hockey, chess skills are the ones that apply to the practice of techniques of chess, florgle skills are the ones that apply to the practice of techniques of florgle. If we have a solid definition of rationality (ideally one concise and generally agreed upon, but any working definition is fine for the purposes of conversation between a few people) then rationality skills are the skills which apply to rationality.
Ehh… I don’t think that this is quite right.
For one thing, the term in question is “rationalist skill” and not “rationality skill”. There’s a difference in connotation… but let’s let this pass for now.
More importantly, I think that your examples are actually all non-circular. Yes, chess skills are the ones that apply to the development (this part can’t be left out!) and practice of techniques of chess. This seems like a perfectly reasonable statement to me. You have the game of chess; you have techniques of playing the game of chess; you have skills which apply to the development and practice of those techniques. Where’s the circularity?
Take baking. You’ve got the act of baking a pie. You’ve got techniques of baking a pie, like “bake covered at a certain temperature (e.g. 425 °F) for a certain time (e.g. 25 minutes), then uncover and continue to bake at some potentially different temperature (e.g. 350 °F) for some more time (e.g. 35 more minutes)”. And you’ve got skills that apply to those techniques, like “carefully removing a sheet of aluminum foil from a hot pie dish in the oven without disturbing the pie or burning yourself”. Seems straightforward to me.
It’s again *plausible *to me that getting better at lying makes someone better at detecting lies (thus having more accurate beliefs.) And of course, in the right circumstance being able to lie well certainly can advance your goals. I’m not against learning to lie in the pursuit of learning to detect lies- that’s practically the whole point of this essay. But I do think it’s worth noting the distinction, and that the goal is learning to detect lies and other manipulations.
Well, again, these are two separate points that I’m making here. One is that getting better at lying makes you better at detecting lies. Another is that being good at lying is useful on its own. They are not really related to each other. You can accept one and not the other.
If we take “rationalist skill” to mean also such skills as are instrumentally-convergently useful in a near-universal set of classes of circumstances, regardless of details, with the only requirement being that interaction between non-perfectly-aligned agents is a significant aspect of the scenario, then my reason #2 should convince us that lying is a rationalist skill.
That argument proves too much I think. The ability to inflict pain and physical damage on other people is convergently useful in interactions between non-perfectly-aligned agents (and I’m Hobbesian enough to think it’s near-universally important at least in potential) but that doesn’t mean I think marksmanship with guns is a rationalist skill. Same with the ability to make friends, or communicate clearly and understand what other people are trying to communicate; it’s useful (probably in even more circumstances than lying is) but I don’t think of clear communication or making friends as a specifically rationalist skill. It’s just a useful thing to be able to do.
Hm… I think it proves exactly the right amount, actually?
Like, “marksmanship with guns” is an unnecessary increase in specificity; if you instead say “the ability to inflict pain and physical damage on other people is convergently useful in interactions between non-perfectly-aligned agents, and is therefore a rationalist skill” then… I think that this is just true (or rather, it fails to be a reductio—the example doesn’t undermine the appeal of the second proposed definition of “rationalist skill”).
(The skill of selecting the optimal method of inflicting pain and physical damage, given your abilities and resources, the skill of deciding what other skills to develop given some goal, etc.—these are also “rationalist skills” in the same sense! So given that you want to be able to inflict pain and physical damage on other people, the question then is how best to do so; “develop marksmanship skill with guns” is one answer, but not the only one.)
Same with the ability to make friends, or communicate clearly and understand what other people are trying to communicate; it’s useful (probably in even more circumstances than lying is) but I don’t think of clear communication or making friends as a specifically rationalist skill. It’s just a useful thing to be able to do.
Same as above.
Note, I am not advocating strongly for the second, more expansive, sort of definition of “rationalist skill”; as I said, I have no strong preference. But I do think that the second definition is basically coherent, and doesn’t lead to absurdity or proving-too-much etc. (There may be other reasons to disprefer it, of course.)
No argument there.
Ehh… I don’t think that this is quite right.
For one thing, the term in question is “rationalist skill” and not “rationality skill”. There’s a difference in connotation… but let’s let this pass for now.
More importantly, I think that your examples are actually all non-circular. Yes, chess skills are the ones that apply to the development (this part can’t be left out!) and practice of techniques of chess. This seems like a perfectly reasonable statement to me. You have the game of chess; you have techniques of playing the game of chess; you have skills which apply to the development and practice of those techniques. Where’s the circularity?
Take baking. You’ve got the act of baking a pie. You’ve got techniques of baking a pie, like “bake covered at a certain temperature (e.g. 425 °F) for a certain time (e.g. 25 minutes), then uncover and continue to bake at some potentially different temperature (e.g. 350 °F) for some more time (e.g. 35 more minutes)”. And you’ve got skills that apply to those techniques, like “carefully removing a sheet of aluminum foil from a hot pie dish in the oven without disturbing the pie or burning yourself”. Seems straightforward to me.
Well, again, these are two separate points that I’m making here. One is that getting better at lying makes you better at detecting lies. Another is that being good at lying is useful on its own. They are not really related to each other. You can accept one and not the other.
Hm… I think it proves exactly the right amount, actually?
Like, “marksmanship with guns” is an unnecessary increase in specificity; if you instead say “the ability to inflict pain and physical damage on other people is convergently useful in interactions between non-perfectly-aligned agents, and is therefore a rationalist skill” then… I think that this is just true (or rather, it fails to be a reductio—the example doesn’t undermine the appeal of the second proposed definition of “rationalist skill”).
(The skill of selecting the optimal method of inflicting pain and physical damage, given your abilities and resources, the skill of deciding what other skills to develop given some goal, etc.—these are also “rationalist skills” in the same sense! So given that you want to be able to inflict pain and physical damage on other people, the question then is how best to do so; “develop marksmanship skill with guns” is one answer, but not the only one.)
Same as above.
Note, I am not advocating strongly for the second, more expansive, sort of definition of “rationalist skill”; as I said, I have no strong preference. But I do think that the second definition is basically coherent, and doesn’t lead to absurdity or proving-too-much etc. (There may be other reasons to disprefer it, of course.)