I kinda think the opposite is true. It’s people who live in cities who join PETA. Country folk get acclimatized to commoditizing animals.
This sounds right to me. After all, you don’t find plantation owners agitating for the rights of slaves. No, it’s people who live off far away from actual slaves, meeting the occasional lucky black guy who managed to make it in the city and noting that he seems morally worthy.
You mean, have not yet expressed an opinion in a way that you understand.
Anyway, the fact that slaves and ex-slaves did advocate for the rights of slaves indicates that closeness to a problem does not necessarily lead one to ignore it.
This makes the claim unfalsifiable. People who work closely with animals are the greatest believers in animal rights? Obviously animals should have rights, since they’re the ones who know the best. People who work closely with animals believe in animal rights the least? Obviously animals should have rights, since people who work closely with animals are rationalizing it away like slaveholders and the people with the least contact with animals are the most objective. No matter what happens, that “proves” that the people who talk about animal rights are the ones we should listen to.
I could make equally-valid stories up to come to the opposite conclusion: People who work closely with animals are the greatest believers in animal rights? Obviously they are prejudiced by their close association. People who work closely with animals believe in animal rights the least? Obviously they’re the ones who know best.
There are two axes here—knowledge and bias. Those who own farms are most biased, but also most knowledgeable. Those who own farms but don’t work on them are both biased and ignorant, so I would predict they are most in favour of farming. Those who are ignorant, but only benefit indirectly—the city dwellers—I would predict higher variance, since it may prove convenient for various reasons to be against it. And finally, the knowledgeable and who benefit only slightly; I would predict that the more knowledge, the more likely that it outweighed the bias.
Of course, I already know these to be true in both cases, pretty much. (Can anyone think of a third example to test these predictions on?) But in general, I would expect large amounts of bias to outweigh knowledge—power corrupts—and low amounts of bias to be eventually overcome by the evidence of nastyness. That’s just human nature (or my model of it), and slavery is just a handy analogy where stuff lined up much the same way.
This argument doesn’t help you. The problem is that the original (implied) claim (that the positions of city-dwellers and farmers happen because vegetarianism is good but people oppose it for irrational reasons) is unfalsifiable: if city-dwellers favor it and farmers oppose it, that happens because vegetarianism is good; if city-dwellers oppose it and farmers favor it, that still happens because vegetarianism is good.
Your explanation in terms of two axes is not wrong, but that explanation implies that the positions of farmers and city-dwellers can go either way regardless of whether vegetarianism is good. In other words, your explanation doesn’t save the original claim, and in fact demolishes it instead.
This argument doesn’t help you. The problem is that the original (implied) claim (that the positions of city-dwellers and farmers happen because vegetarianism is good but people oppose it for irrational reasons) is unfalsifiable: if city-dwellers favor it and farmers oppose it, that happens because vegetarianism is good; if city-dwellers oppose it and farmers favor it, that still happens because vegetarianism is good.
Your explanation in terms of two axes is not wrong, but that explanation implies that the positions of farmers and city-dwellers can go either way regardless of whether vegetarianism is good.
What? No. Where are you getting that from?
In other words, your explanation doesn’t save the original claim, and in fact demolishes it instead.
Which original claim? I just pointed out that you have to take bias into account.
This sounds right to me. After all, you don’t find plantation owners agitating for the rights of slaves. No, it’s people who live off far away from actual slaves, meeting the occasional lucky black guy who managed to make it in the city and noting that he seems morally worthy.
Um, what about the actual slaves and ex-slaves?
In this analogy, they correspond to non-human animals, who have not yet expressed an opinion on the matter.
You mean, have not yet expressed an opinion in a way that you understand.
Anyway, the fact that slaves and ex-slaves did advocate for the rights of slaves indicates that closeness to a problem does not necessarily lead one to ignore it.
They did not benefit from slavery, as the plantation owners did.
Sorry, that was meant to be the implication of “plantation owners”—“they’re biased”, not “anyone who actually met slaves was fine with it.”.
This makes the claim unfalsifiable. People who work closely with animals are the greatest believers in animal rights? Obviously animals should have rights, since they’re the ones who know the best. People who work closely with animals believe in animal rights the least? Obviously animals should have rights, since people who work closely with animals are rationalizing it away like slaveholders and the people with the least contact with animals are the most objective. No matter what happens, that “proves” that the people who talk about animal rights are the ones we should listen to.
I could make equally-valid stories up to come to the opposite conclusion: People who work closely with animals are the greatest believers in animal rights? Obviously they are prejudiced by their close association. People who work closely with animals believe in animal rights the least? Obviously they’re the ones who know best.
If you can explain everything, you can’t explain anything.
There are two axes here—knowledge and bias. Those who own farms are most biased, but also most knowledgeable. Those who own farms but don’t work on them are both biased and ignorant, so I would predict they are most in favour of farming. Those who are ignorant, but only benefit indirectly—the city dwellers—I would predict higher variance, since it may prove convenient for various reasons to be against it. And finally, the knowledgeable and who benefit only slightly; I would predict that the more knowledge, the more likely that it outweighed the bias.
Of course, I already know these to be true in both cases, pretty much. (Can anyone think of a third example to test these predictions on?) But in general, I would expect large amounts of bias to outweigh knowledge—power corrupts—and low amounts of bias to be eventually overcome by the evidence of nastyness. That’s just human nature (or my model of it), and slavery is just a handy analogy where stuff lined up much the same way.
This argument doesn’t help you. The problem is that the original (implied) claim (that the positions of city-dwellers and farmers happen because vegetarianism is good but people oppose it for irrational reasons) is unfalsifiable: if city-dwellers favor it and farmers oppose it, that happens because vegetarianism is good; if city-dwellers oppose it and farmers favor it, that still happens because vegetarianism is good.
Your explanation in terms of two axes is not wrong, but that explanation implies that the positions of farmers and city-dwellers can go either way regardless of whether vegetarianism is good. In other words, your explanation doesn’t save the original claim, and in fact demolishes it instead.
What? No. Where are you getting that from?
Which original claim? I just pointed out that you have to take bias into account.