When we simulate a brain on a general purpose computer, however, there is no physically similar pattern of energy/matter flow. If I had to guess, I suspect this is the rub: you must need a certain physical pattern of energy flow to get consciousness.
I invite you to evaluate the procedural integrity of your reasoning.
Do you really expect that “a certain physical pattern of energy flow” causes consciousness? Why? Can you even begin to articulate what that pattern might consist of? What is it about a computer model that fails to adequately account for the physical energy flow? Didn’t you stipulate earlier that our model will “stick to an atom-by-atom (or complex amplitudes) approach”? Is there a difference between complex amplitudes and patterns of energy flow?
Do you really expect that “a certain physical pattern of energy flow” causes consciousness? Why? Can you even begin to articulate what that pattern might consist of?
The third question seems to call for advances in neuropsychology. And if that’s correct, the first two questions probably face a similar need.
We know redness or sweetness when we see it, but we are in no position to define the processes that regularly explain these experiences. If we can find a property of neural processes that always leads to sweet sensations, and underlies all sweet sensations, then we’ll know what (or whether) patterns of energy flow matter for that sensation.
This is not intended as a criticism. But it sometimes seems to me the philosophical practice of choosing simple examples of a concept often strips away all hope of learning something about the concept from the example.
For example, it the above had been written “We know puceness or umaminess when we see it”, we might have some hope of connecting the concept of perceiving the qualia with the concept of learning the name of the qualia.
I guess my concern is that you have not indicated your reason(s) for promoting the hypothesis that “energy flow” causes consciousness.
As for “advances in neuropsychology,” what do you mean by “neuropsychology” besides a field that includes the study of consciousness? I certainly agree with you that further advances in the study of consciousness would be useful in identifying the causes of consciousness, but why would you assert that consciousness is caused by energy flow? If I understand you correctly, you are confident that the study of consciousness will lead researchers to conclude that it is caused by energy flow. Why?
I’m not confident that consciousness is caused by energy flow; I regard it as one of several (families of) wide-open and highly plausible hypotheses. I’m promoting the hypothesis only to the extent of calling it premature to rule it out.
I invite you to evaluate the procedural integrity of your reasoning.
Do you really expect that “a certain physical pattern of energy flow” causes consciousness? Why? Can you even begin to articulate what that pattern might consist of? What is it about a computer model that fails to adequately account for the physical energy flow? Didn’t you stipulate earlier that our model will “stick to an atom-by-atom (or complex amplitudes) approach”? Is there a difference between complex amplitudes and patterns of energy flow?
The third question seems to call for advances in neuropsychology. And if that’s correct, the first two questions probably face a similar need.
We know redness or sweetness when we see it, but we are in no position to define the processes that regularly explain these experiences. If we can find a property of neural processes that always leads to sweet sensations, and underlies all sweet sensations, then we’ll know what (or whether) patterns of energy flow matter for that sensation.
This is not intended as a criticism. But it sometimes seems to me the philosophical practice of choosing simple examples of a concept often strips away all hope of learning something about the concept from the example.
For example, it the above had been written “We know puceness or umaminess when we see it”, we might have some hope of connecting the concept of perceiving the qualia with the concept of learning the name of the qualia.
I guess my concern is that you have not indicated your reason(s) for promoting the hypothesis that “energy flow” causes consciousness.
As for “advances in neuropsychology,” what do you mean by “neuropsychology” besides a field that includes the study of consciousness? I certainly agree with you that further advances in the study of consciousness would be useful in identifying the causes of consciousness, but why would you assert that consciousness is caused by energy flow? If I understand you correctly, you are confident that the study of consciousness will lead researchers to conclude that it is caused by energy flow. Why?
I’m not confident that consciousness is caused by energy flow; I regard it as one of several (families of) wide-open and highly plausible hypotheses. I’m promoting the hypothesis only to the extent of calling it premature to rule it out.