You take some random 20 bit number and say that you will flip the equipment 20 times and if the outcome is the same as the predetermined number, then you will take it as a one to million evidence that the Multiple World theory works as expected.
That doesn’t convince anyone else; from their perspective, in Bayesian terms, the experiment has the same million-to-one improbability of producing this result, regardless of whether QTI is true, since they’re not dying in the other worlds. From your perspective, you’ve ended up in a world where you experienced what feels like strong evidence of QTI being true, but you can never communicate this evidence to anyone else. If we hook up a doomsday device to the coinflipper, then in worlds where we survive, we can never convince aliens.
That doesn’t convince anyone else; from their perspective, in Bayesian terms, the experiment has the same million-to-one improbability of producing this result, regardless of whether QTI is true, since they’re not dying in the other worlds. From your perspective, you’ve ended up in a world where you experienced what feels like strong evidence of QTI being true, but you can never communicate this evidence to anyone else. If we hook up a doomsday device to the coinflipper, then in worlds where we survive, we can never convince aliens.