You can assign high negative utility to certain death.
You can, but then you should also do so in the expected utility calculation, which is never actually done in most discussions of MWI in this context, and isn’t done in this post. The problem is using MWI as rationalization for invalid intuitions.
I did it implicitly in the OP. Assuming that, you get a better expected value in the quantum scenario.
A logical coin flip be much more scary (and negative utility) assuming certain death for some of the participiants.
(I don’t buy quantum immortality arguments. They resemble on Achilles-Turtle problem: Being rescued in shorter and shorter intervals does not imply being rescued for a fixed time.)
You can assign high negative utility to certain death.
You can, but then you should also do so in the expected utility calculation, which is never actually done in most discussions of MWI in this context, and isn’t done in this post. The problem is using MWI as rationalization for invalid intuitions.
I did it implicitly in the OP. Assuming that, you get a better expected value in the quantum scenario.
A logical coin flip be much more scary (and negative utility) assuming certain death for some of the participiants.
(I don’t buy quantum immortality arguments. They resemble on Achilles-Turtle problem: Being rescued in shorter and shorter intervals does not imply being rescued for a fixed time.)