2) Yes, that is true. I did leave out a sentence saying that “this assumes that there are no higher P(doom) realities in our list of plausible realities.” I left it our for readibility for the audience of the original publication (Phi/AI). I concede that for LW I should have done a more rigorous version.
But still I think the logic to lower our P(doom) holds in that specific analysis (all 3 alternatives might have some failsafes). And in my eyes it would hold also if we look at the current landscape of the top most plausible metaphysics, where there really is not much more “unsafe” than physicalism in terms of human survival.
3) I think you are not correct in your conclusions about physicalism. Physicalism is, by its proper definition, a philosophical belief: “Physicalism is the philosophical view that everything in existence is fundamentally physical, or at least ultimately depends on the physical, meaning there is “nothing over and above” the physical world.” This means that physicalism goes beyond the “simple logic” you described. The simple logic you described can only ever explain the parts of our reality that can be subjected to experimental observation—i.e. it’s limited by the descriptive scope of science. But physicalism goes beyond that by believing that there is nothing “extra” added beyond that.
For example, if our world would be a simulation with fixed rules (physical laws) run by an alien, your simple logic could not distinguish that from a scenario where our world just “popped up from nothing.” So the only “special place” physicalism holds among philosophical views is that it introduces the least amount of “extra assumptions.” But that says nothing about its ultimate plausibility.
Another way to picture this is that everytime we want to build a complete model of reality, there will be two parts: one verifiable by experiment (science) and the other inherently unverifiable (philosophy). The fact that physicalism is picking the “simplest, least complicated philosophical framework” should in no way lead us to ignore all the other, equally unverifiable, alternatives.
4) I am not the one originally making the claim that the experiments that proved non-locality of QM had profound implications on metaphysical and philosophical discourse. In the post, I link to the article “Enter experimental metaphysics” by Hans Busstra, which might help you understand the context.
5) This article is only the very introduction to my ultimate goal of exploring alternative metaphysical frameworks to find novel approaches to AI safety. I’m sure the rationale will be clearer as I release further articles and I warmly invite you to read the full series.
(2) I hope you’ll dig into this more in those future posts, because I think it is extremely non-obvious.
(3) Yes, I will concede that example, you’re right. For any observer in any possible world, there are an arbitrarily large number of larger universes within which it could be a perfect simulation, and these would be indistinguishable from the inside. This is a thing we cannot know, and the choice to then act as if those unknowable things don’t exist is an additional choice. I definitely did not think this was the kind of metaphysical context you were pointing towards, considering that your post is ultimately about how non-physicalist metaphysical assumptions should alter our expectations regarding possible future events in our world. I hope in future posts you’ll explain (a) why you think this kind of class of indistinguishable-in-principle worlds is interesting and useful to think about, and (b) how it relates to the topic of this post.
(4) Yes, I did read it, and didn’t find anything novel in it, though it was a good summary of a common viewpoint. I am aware you are not the originator of this viewpoint. I am also aware that QM (or more specifically, a set of beliefs about QM) has, indeed, had profound implications on metaphysical and philosophical discourse. This is because the pioneers of QM were confused about what they were learning; how could they not be? That’s what being a pioneer is. And they taught generations of physicists in ways that perpetuated that confusion without holding back technical progress in experimental physics. But the theorists have continued to make progress, and physics does know that e.g. none of this requires any kind of conscious observers or retrocausality or superluminal signal transmission. That’s a confusion that has persisted, even among many physicists (or at least, among their readily available analogies for describing things colloquially), not a part of the physics itself.
2) Yes, that is true. I did leave out a sentence saying that “this assumes that there are no higher P(doom) realities in our list of plausible realities.” I left it our for readibility for the audience of the original publication (Phi/AI). I concede that for LW I should have done a more rigorous version.
But still I think the logic to lower our P(doom) holds in that specific analysis (all 3 alternatives might have some failsafes). And in my eyes it would hold also if we look at the current landscape of the top most plausible metaphysics, where there really is not much more “unsafe” than physicalism in terms of human survival.
3) I think you are not correct in your conclusions about physicalism. Physicalism is, by its proper definition, a philosophical belief: “Physicalism is the philosophical view that everything in existence is fundamentally physical, or at least ultimately depends on the physical, meaning there is “nothing over and above” the physical world.” This means that physicalism goes beyond the “simple logic” you described. The simple logic you described can only ever explain the parts of our reality that can be subjected to experimental observation—i.e. it’s limited by the descriptive scope of science. But physicalism goes beyond that by believing that there is nothing “extra” added beyond that.
For example, if our world would be a simulation with fixed rules (physical laws) run by an alien, your simple logic could not distinguish that from a scenario where our world just “popped up from nothing.” So the only “special place” physicalism holds among philosophical views is that it introduces the least amount of “extra assumptions.” But that says nothing about its ultimate plausibility.
Another way to picture this is that everytime we want to build a complete model of reality, there will be two parts: one verifiable by experiment (science) and the other inherently unverifiable (philosophy). The fact that physicalism is picking the “simplest, least complicated philosophical framework” should in no way lead us to ignore all the other, equally unverifiable, alternatives.
4) I am not the one originally making the claim that the experiments that proved non-locality of QM had profound implications on metaphysical and philosophical discourse. In the post, I link to the article “Enter experimental metaphysics” by Hans Busstra, which might help you understand the context.
5) This article is only the very introduction to my ultimate goal of exploring alternative metaphysical frameworks to find novel approaches to AI safety. I’m sure the rationale will be clearer as I release further articles and I warmly invite you to read the full series.
(5) I look forward to it.
(2) I hope you’ll dig into this more in those future posts, because I think it is extremely non-obvious.
(3) Yes, I will concede that example, you’re right. For any observer in any possible world, there are an arbitrarily large number of larger universes within which it could be a perfect simulation, and these would be indistinguishable from the inside. This is a thing we cannot know, and the choice to then act as if those unknowable things don’t exist is an additional choice. I definitely did not think this was the kind of metaphysical context you were pointing towards, considering that your post is ultimately about how non-physicalist metaphysical assumptions should alter our expectations regarding possible future events in our world. I hope in future posts you’ll explain (a) why you think this kind of class of indistinguishable-in-principle worlds is interesting and useful to think about, and (b) how it relates to the topic of this post.
(4) Yes, I did read it, and didn’t find anything novel in it, though it was a good summary of a common viewpoint. I am aware you are not the originator of this viewpoint. I am also aware that QM (or more specifically, a set of beliefs about QM) has, indeed, had profound implications on metaphysical and philosophical discourse. This is because the pioneers of QM were confused about what they were learning; how could they not be? That’s what being a pioneer is. And they taught generations of physicists in ways that perpetuated that confusion without holding back technical progress in experimental physics. But the theorists have continued to make progress, and physics does know that e.g. none of this requires any kind of conscious observers or retrocausality or superluminal signal transmission. That’s a confusion that has persisted, even among many physicists (or at least, among their readily available analogies for describing things colloquially), not a part of the physics itself.