I don’t see why it would change it (ignoring pain of death and childbirth, and cost of raising kids, of course).
Also, since birth is death in reverse, I’d expect it to count as negative one deaths, so the net amount of death is zero anyway. This is sort of like how, since pain makes you want it to happen less, I count it as negative pleasure.
Also, as I said in the beginning, I don’t believe in personal identity. If one choice is for everyone to die every night and be instantly replaced with someone who has the same memories, and the other choice is to go on as normal, I wouldn’t care at all between them because they’re the same choice.
If one choice is for everyone to die every night and be instantly replaced with someone who has the same memories, and the other choice is to go on as normal, I wouldn’t care at all between them because they’re the same choice.
Does not necessarily imply that you don’t believe in personal identity, just that personal identity is not something that is attached to the body, something all (most) physicalists would agree on.
I don’t see why it would change it (ignoring pain of death and childbirth, and cost of raising kids, of course).
Also, since birth is death in reverse, I’d expect it to count as negative one deaths, so the net amount of death is zero anyway. This is sort of like how, since pain makes you want it to happen less, I count it as negative pleasure.
Also, as I said in the beginning, I don’t believe in personal identity. If one choice is for everyone to die every night and be instantly replaced with someone who has the same memories, and the other choice is to go on as normal, I wouldn’t care at all between them because they’re the same choice.
Saying:
Does not necessarily imply that you don’t believe in personal identity, just that personal identity is not something that is attached to the body, something all (most) physicalists would agree on.