This is essentially an instance of availability bias. Of course, the most interesting case, rather than just a declarative hypothesis elevated among the other inhabitants of the hypothesis space for that particular question, models have other effects that go far beyond merely availability.
This is because our initial model won’t just form the first thing we think of when we examine the question, but some of the very structures we use when we formulate the question. Indeed, how we handle our models is easily responsible for the majority of the biases that have been discussed here and at Overcoming Bias.
In the case of the models mentioned in this post about quantum mechanics—we can look at the first quantum mechanics interpretation as having its own version of hypothesis privilege. This means we should downgrade it. Of course we should also do the same with its immediate successor, Many Worlds (although perhaps not as much). After all, it is the interpretations we haven’t thought of which are being penalized the most by the effect of privileging the hypothesis.
But to adequately apply this discounting beyond the direct route we need to understand the way which these model affect our thinking. How do these models encourage other models being developed, and how do they blind our cognitive architecture from different avenues?
This becomes even more pronounced when more is at stake than epistemic rationality. Since these two models are also sides (even fairly politely) in cultural and political conflicts, there are further biases that arise, as parts of these ideas become further tied to status, self-esteem, social behaviors, and habits.
This is essentially an instance of availability bias. Of course, the most interesting case, rather than just a declarative hypothesis elevated among the other inhabitants of the hypothesis space for that particular question, models have other effects that go far beyond merely availability.
This is because our initial model won’t just form the first thing we think of when we examine the question, but some of the very structures we use when we formulate the question. Indeed, how we handle our models is easily responsible for the majority of the biases that have been discussed here and at Overcoming Bias.
In the case of the models mentioned in this post about quantum mechanics—we can look at the first quantum mechanics interpretation as having its own version of hypothesis privilege. This means we should downgrade it. Of course we should also do the same with its immediate successor, Many Worlds (although perhaps not as much). After all, it is the interpretations we haven’t thought of which are being penalized the most by the effect of privileging the hypothesis.
But to adequately apply this discounting beyond the direct route we need to understand the way which these model affect our thinking. How do these models encourage other models being developed, and how do they blind our cognitive architecture from different avenues?
This becomes even more pronounced when more is at stake than epistemic rationality. Since these two models are also sides (even fairly politely) in cultural and political conflicts, there are further biases that arise, as parts of these ideas become further tied to status, self-esteem, social behaviors, and habits.