they managed to have almost the same GNP as France while keeping larger military spending, it’s not surprising that they won the war
of course, it may be surprising that they managed to get there. Given the model, you would expect that they sacrificed internal stability, but in fact it was France that was the most unstable country in that period! (Revolution, Napoleon, restoration, second Republic, second empire)
you could say the political instability may have really hindered France, forcing higher consumption spending, but how comes this was true only post-napoleon?
back to Prussia: it is the case that they never needed to maintain superiority over Austria and France over a long period. Nearly everyone in Germany wanted to unify, the question was how/under whom. The Prussians in 1970 needed few quick victories to convince everyone that they were the only choice. For this reason they could focus on the short term. After that, they absorbed the rest of Germany which had focused on economy. Compare the parallel unification of Italy under Piedmont/Sardinia, a much weaker power that played a similar strategy.
It’s not a coincidence that Hegel came up with the Zeitgeist idea exactly in 1800s Germany...
My overall take is that this is an useful starting point, and that structural factors are often underestimated, but the model is too simplified to actually make predictions with any confidence.
These are great points, thank you for pointing them out. I think I agree with your overall take—the analysis is not finished with Kennedy’s framework, rather it’s a good place to start. We can then go into more detail on each trade-off—analyzing why Japan gets to an investment rate of 45% whereas the Soviet Union only to 30%, say.
On your specific points:
1. Good point—although I think this can only be taken so far. The Entente powers spent less on the military but had slightly higher overall economic output, and that’s why they had an advantage. Certainly its unusual that Germany would defeat France so decisively.
2. I agree! Which I think is one of the reasons why Prussia sits uneasily in the framework. I think its worth noting that whereas France had domestic issues—Prussia had significantly worse external problems. These caused far more destruction than France’s convulsions. The “Miracle of the house of brandenburg” and the fact that the non-Russian Napoleonic wars were fought mostly in Germany come to mind.
3. Why do you say it wasn’t true pre-Napoleon?
4. I think I have to disagree here. Prussia was in a century and a half contest with Austria the moment it seized the Silesian coal fields. I agree that quick and decisive victories did the trick, but the difficulty is its not clear how Prussia managed to win decisive victories whilst not falling behind economically.
Maybe military spending has a variable ‘rate of return’ just like investment? That would allow the Prussian army to get more bang for its buck, which fits my impression of what happened.
On Prussia:
they managed to have almost the same GNP as France while keeping larger military spending, it’s not surprising that they won the war
of course, it may be surprising that they managed to get there. Given the model, you would expect that they sacrificed internal stability, but in fact it was France that was the most unstable country in that period! (Revolution, Napoleon, restoration, second Republic, second empire)
you could say the political instability may have really hindered France, forcing higher consumption spending, but how comes this was true only post-napoleon?
back to Prussia: it is the case that they never needed to maintain superiority over Austria and France over a long period. Nearly everyone in Germany wanted to unify, the question was how/under whom. The Prussians in 1970 needed few quick victories to convince everyone that they were the only choice. For this reason they could focus on the short term. After that, they absorbed the rest of Germany which had focused on economy. Compare the parallel unification of Italy under Piedmont/Sardinia, a much weaker power that played a similar strategy.
It’s not a coincidence that Hegel came up with the Zeitgeist idea exactly in 1800s Germany...
My overall take is that this is an useful starting point, and that structural factors are often underestimated, but the model is too simplified to actually make predictions with any confidence.
These are great points, thank you for pointing them out. I think I agree with your overall take—the analysis is not finished with Kennedy’s framework, rather it’s a good place to start. We can then go into more detail on each trade-off—analyzing why Japan gets to an investment rate of 45% whereas the Soviet Union only to 30%, say.
On your specific points:
1. Good point—although I think this can only be taken so far. The Entente powers spent less on the military but had slightly higher overall economic output, and that’s why they had an advantage. Certainly its unusual that Germany would defeat France so decisively.
2. I agree! Which I think is one of the reasons why Prussia sits uneasily in the framework. I think its worth noting that whereas France had domestic issues—Prussia had significantly worse external problems. These caused far more destruction than France’s convulsions. The “Miracle of the house of brandenburg” and the fact that the non-Russian Napoleonic wars were fought mostly in Germany come to mind.
3. Why do you say it wasn’t true pre-Napoleon?
4. I think I have to disagree here. Prussia was in a century and a half contest with Austria the moment it seized the Silesian coal fields. I agree that quick and decisive victories did the trick, but the difficulty is its not clear how Prussia managed to win decisive victories whilst not falling behind economically.
Maybe military spending has a variable ‘rate of return’ just like investment? That would allow the Prussian army to get more bang for its buck, which fits my impression of what happened.