In this and your previous comment, you write as though as though rQM is a different formalism, a different theory,
leading to different results. It isn’t.
On the other hand, you can probably agree that removing objective reality from one’s ontology would make MWI an unnecessary addition to a perfectly good model called relational quantum mechanics.
In principle rQM could suggest a different mental picture, and one better capable of inspiring further models that will make successful predictions. (Assuming shminux’s bizarre positivist-like approach admits the existence of mental pictures.) The “better capable” part seems unlikely to this layman. Feynman’s path integrals have a very MWI-like feel to me, and Feynman himself shared that impression when he wrote the book with Hibbs. But since paths that go back in time seem to pose a problem for Eliezer’s causality-based approach, perhaps shminux has some reason for preferring rQM that I don’t see. I’m still betting against it.
In this and your previous comment, you write as though as though rQM is a different formalism, a different theory, leading to different results. It isn’t.
Feel free to quote the statement that led you to such a strange conclusion.
and
In principle rQM could suggest a different mental picture, and one better capable of inspiring further models that will make successful predictions. (Assuming shminux’s bizarre positivist-like approach admits the existence of mental pictures.) The “better capable” part seems unlikely to this layman. Feynman’s path integrals have a very MWI-like feel to me, and Feynman himself shared that impression when he wrote the book with Hibbs. But since paths that go back in time seem to pose a problem for Eliezer’s causality-based approach, perhaps shminux has some reason for preferring rQM that I don’t see. I’m still betting against it.