But, for instance, we know that flaws in our way of thinking about politics are so pervasive that we’ve decided to avoid it as much as possible. I would argue that flaws in our way of assessing whether other people in an online argument are arguing in good faith are nearly as pervasive, to the extent that assuming good faith is a better heuristic than assuming bad faith as much as is suggested by evidence.
And people who use an “assume good faith” model still change their mind once the evidence starts to accumulate; it’s about what your default assumption is, not whether it’s ever appropriate to say “You are arguing in bad faith.”
But, for instance, we know that flaws in our way of thinking about politics are so pervasive that we’ve decided to avoid it as much as possible. I would argue that flaws in our way of assessing whether other people in an online argument are arguing in good faith are nearly as pervasive, to the extent that assuming good faith is a better heuristic than assuming bad faith as much as is suggested by evidence.
And people who use an “assume good faith” model still change their mind once the evidence starts to accumulate; it’s about what your default assumption is, not whether it’s ever appropriate to say “You are arguing in bad faith.”