Very thoughtful piece which I am still musing over...
The section that left me most uncertain is 2.3.1 (“How international must a Halt be, and on what timescale?”), especially the open question: “What can be done to increase US centralization of AI development?”
I would expect that today, most states rank “other great powers with advanced AI” above “misaligned AI” in their threat models. Until that ordering flips, relying on US centralization of AI development to implement a Halt strategy may actually exacerbate some of the failure modes the agenda wants to avoid e.g. War: AI‑related conflict between great powers causes catastrophic harm.
I don’t have a tidy solution, but I suspect a crisper picture of stakeholder payoff matrices would help to design any Halt i.e. hard constraints and potential trust‑building moves that a viable Halt has to respect.
Very thoughtful piece which I am still musing over...
The section that left me most uncertain is 2.3.1 (“How international must a Halt be, and on what timescale?”), especially the open question: “What can be done to increase US centralization of AI development?”
I would expect that today, most states rank “other great powers with advanced AI” above “misaligned AI” in their threat models. Until that ordering flips, relying on US centralization of AI development to implement a Halt strategy may actually exacerbate some of the failure modes the agenda wants to avoid e.g. War: AI‑related conflict between great powers causes catastrophic harm.
I don’t have a tidy solution, but I suspect a crisper picture of stakeholder payoff matrices would help to design any Halt i.e. hard constraints and potential trust‑building moves that a viable Halt has to respect.
Any thoughts on this?