Meta-note: I think the actual argument here is decent, but using the phrase “power dynamics” will correctly cause a bunch of people to dismiss it without reading the details. “Power”, as political scientists use the term, is IMO something like a principle component which might have some statistical explanatory power, but is actively unhelpful for building gears-level models.
I would suggest instead the phrase “bargaining dynamics”, which I think points to the gearsy parts of “power” while omitting the actively-unhelpful parts.
(I assume that by “gears-level models” you mean a combination of reasoning about actors’ concrete capabilities; and game-theory-style models of interaction where we can reach concrete conclusions? If so,)
I would turn this around, and say instead that “gears-level models” alone tend to not be that great for understanding how power works.
The problem is that power is partly recursive. For example, A may have power by virtue of being able to get B to do things for it, but B’s willingness also depends on A’s power. All actors, in parallel, are looking around, trying to understand the landscape of power and possibility, and making decisions based on their understanding, changing that landscape in turn. The resulting dynamics can just be incredibly complicated. Abstractions can come to have something almost like causal power, like a rumor starting a stampede.
We have formal tools for thinking about these kinds of things, like common knowledge, and game-theoretic equilibria. But my impression is that they’re pretty far from being able to describe most important power dynamics in the world.
I do not think they’re far from being able to describe most important power dynamics, although one does need to go beyond game-theory-101. In particular, Schelling’s work is key for things like “rumor starting a stampede” or abstractions having causal power, as well as properly understanding threats, the importance of risk tolerance, and various other aspects particularly relevant to bargaining dynamics.
Meta-note: I think the actual argument here is decent, but using the phrase “power dynamics” will correctly cause a bunch of people to dismiss it without reading the details. “Power”, as political scientists use the term, is IMO something like a principle component which might have some statistical explanatory power, but is actively unhelpful for building gears-level models.
I would suggest instead the phrase “bargaining dynamics”, which I think points to the gearsy parts of “power” while omitting the actively-unhelpful parts.
(I assume that by “gears-level models” you mean a combination of reasoning about actors’ concrete capabilities; and game-theory-style models of interaction where we can reach concrete conclusions? If so,)
I would turn this around, and say instead that “gears-level models” alone tend to not be that great for understanding how power works.
The problem is that power is partly recursive. For example, A may have power by virtue of being able to get B to do things for it, but B’s willingness also depends on A’s power. All actors, in parallel, are looking around, trying to understand the landscape of power and possibility, and making decisions based on their understanding, changing that landscape in turn. The resulting dynamics can just be incredibly complicated. Abstractions can come to have something almost like causal power, like a rumor starting a stampede.
We have formal tools for thinking about these kinds of things, like common knowledge, and game-theoretic equilibria. But my impression is that they’re pretty far from being able to describe most important power dynamics in the world.
I do not think they’re far from being able to describe most important power dynamics, although one does need to go beyond game-theory-101. In particular, Schelling’s work is key for things like “rumor starting a stampede” or abstractions having causal power, as well as properly understanding threats, the importance of risk tolerance, and various other aspects particularly relevant to bargaining dynamics.