Beliefs where the transgression that reduces status is saying them, not believing them. (Distinct from saying them being used as evidence of the transgression of believing them). If someone read your mind and discovered them, you would not have committed the transgression with a rude belief, but you would with a stupid belief.
A third category (which I think you might think the belief you’re trying to classify fits into) is where it’s believing it that is the transgression, not because it’s believed to be wrong, losing you epistemic credibility, but because the belief is repulsive, losing you another kind of status. If losing status besides epistemic credibility is your motivation for avoiding discussing this belief, do not include it. However, if you believe that people’s disgust for your belief will cause you to lose epistemic credibility in their eyes as a side effect, and that is your motivation (by this I mean it’s a necessary condition) for not discussing it, include it.
Beliefs where the transgression that reduces status is saying them, not believing them. (Distinct from saying them being used as evidence of the transgression of believing them). If someone read your mind and discovered them, you would not have committed the transgression with a rude belief, but you would with a stupid belief.
A third category (which I think you might think the belief you’re trying to classify fits into) is where it’s believing it that is the transgression, not because it’s believed to be wrong, losing you epistemic credibility, but because the belief is repulsive, losing you another kind of status. If losing status besides epistemic credibility is your motivation for avoiding discussing this belief, do not include it. However, if you believe that people’s disgust for your belief will cause you to lose epistemic credibility in their eyes as a side effect, and that is your motivation (by this I mean it’s a necessary condition) for not discussing it, include it.