I’m saying that people do value honesty, but can’t pursue it as a value effectively because of faulty cognitive machinery, poor epistemic skills, and a dislike of admitting (even to themselves) that they are wrong. I think that the Lesswrong / rationalist / skeptic community tends to be comprised of folks with superior cognitive machinery and epistemic skills in this dimension. When people say “I value honesty” they believe that they are speaking honestly, even if they aren’t entirely sure what truth means.
As I see it, you’re saying that people do not value honesty and purposefully choose to ignore it in favor of other, more instrumental values. And you extend this trait to the Lesswrong / rationalist / skeptic community as well. When people say “I value honesty”, in their mind they know it to be a lie but do not care. If they were to ever say “I consider truth to be whatever is socially useful”, in their mind they would believe that this an honest statement.
Both our hypotheses explain the same phenomenon. My mental disagreement flowchart says that it is time to ask the following questions:
0) Did I state your point and derive its logical implications correctly? Do you find my point coherent, even if it’s wrong?
1) Do you have evidence (anecdotal or otherwise) which favors your hypothesis above mine?
(My evidence is that neurotypical humans experience guilt when being dishonest, and this makes being dishonest difficult. Do you dispute the truth of this evidence? Alternatively, do you dispute that this evidence increases the likelihood of my hypothesis?)
2) Do you stake a claim to parsimony? I do, since my hypothesis relies entirely on what we already know about biases and variations in the ability to think logically.
I’m saying that people do value honesty, but can’t pursue it as a value effectively because of faulty cognitive machinery, poor epistemic skills, and a dislike of admitting (even to themselves) that they are wrong. I think that the Lesswrong / rationalist / skeptic community tends to be comprised of folks with superior cognitive machinery and epistemic skills in this dimension. When people say “I value honesty” they believe that they are speaking honestly, even if they aren’t entirely sure what truth means.
As I see it, you’re saying that people do not value honesty and purposefully choose to ignore it in favor of other, more instrumental values. And you extend this trait to the Lesswrong / rationalist / skeptic community as well. When people say “I value honesty”, in their mind they know it to be a lie but do not care. If they were to ever say “I consider truth to be whatever is socially useful”, in their mind they would believe that this an honest statement.
Both our hypotheses explain the same phenomenon. My mental disagreement flowchart says that it is time to ask the following questions:
0) Did I state your point and derive its logical implications correctly? Do you find my point coherent, even if it’s wrong?
1) Do you have evidence (anecdotal or otherwise) which favors your hypothesis above mine?
(My evidence is that neurotypical humans experience guilt when being dishonest, and this makes being dishonest difficult. Do you dispute the truth of this evidence? Alternatively, do you dispute that this evidence increases the likelihood of my hypothesis?)
2) Do you stake a claim to parsimony? I do, since my hypothesis relies entirely on what we already know about biases and variations in the ability to think logically.