Quantum suicide vs. Aumann has been discussed a couple times before, and yes, it’s very confusing.
Intuitive support for this is the fact that if a QI experiment were actually performed, and we consider the viewpoint of the one surviving 300 successive trials, he would certainly conclude that QI was true, and our intuitions say that the outside observers should admit that he’s right.
My intuitions say outside observers should not update their estimates one bit, and I’m pretty sure this is correct, unless they should also increase their probability of MWI on making the equivalent observation of a coin coming up heads 300 times in a row.
Quantum suicide vs. Aumann has been discussed a couple times before, and yes, it’s very confusing.
Intuitive support for this is the fact that if a QI experiment were actually performed, and we consider the viewpoint of the one surviving 300 successive trials, he would certainly conclude that QI was true, and our intuitions say that the outside observers should admit that he’s right.
My intuitions say outside observers should not update their estimates one bit, and I’m pretty sure this is correct, unless they should also increase their probability of MWI on making the equivalent observation of a coin coming up heads 300 times in a row.
(although there would also be the difficulty that a chance other than 50% is not easy to reconcile with a many-worlds theory anyway.) http://www.hedweb.com/everett/everett.htm#probabilities http://hanson.gmu.edu/mangledworlds.html