Of things that I am very confident are false which are believed by communities? Basically things like “the other communities have very little grasp on reality,” when in fact they all share a large core of things in common. But when the other community describes that core in different words, they say that the words are meaningless or ignorant or false, even though in fact they are all talking about the same thing and are roughly in agreement about it.
For example, when Eliezer talks about “how an algorithm feels from the inside,” he is basically talking about the same thing that Thomas Nagel is talking about when he talks about things like “what it is like to be a bat.” But I suspect that Eliezer would be offended by the comparison, despite its accuracy.
Likewise, Eliezer’s identification of AIs with their program is basically the same kind of thing as identifying a human being with an immaterial soul—both are wrong, and in basically the same way and for the same reasons, but there is something right that both are getting at. Again, I am quite sure Eliezer would feel offended by this comparison, despite its accuracy.
The same thing is true of TDT—it is basically in agreement with a form of virtue theory or deontological ethics. But since Eliezer came to his conclusion via utilitarianism, he thinks he is right and the others are wrong. In reality they are both right, but the other people were right first.
Of course this happens a bit differently with communities than it does with individuals and individual claims. I used individuals in these examples because the situation is clearer there, but there is an analagous situation with communities. This might be a selective effect—a community preserves its own existence by emphasizing its difference with others. Consider how diverse languages develops. Naturally there would just be a continuum of languages, with the people in the middle speaking something intermediate between the people on the two ends. But larger breaks happen because people say, “we don’t talk like those fellows on the other side of the fence.” In the same way communities preserve their existence by emphasizing how bad the other communities are.
The fact that I do not want to do this means that I cannot fit well into any community.
Of things that I am very confident are false which are believed by communities? Basically things like “the other communities have very little grasp on reality,” when in fact they all share a large core of things in common. But when the other community describes that core in different words, they say that the words are meaningless or ignorant or false, even though in fact they are all talking about the same thing and are roughly in agreement about it.
For example, when Eliezer talks about “how an algorithm feels from the inside,” he is basically talking about the same thing that Thomas Nagel is talking about when he talks about things like “what it is like to be a bat.” But I suspect that Eliezer would be offended by the comparison, despite its accuracy.
Likewise, Eliezer’s identification of AIs with their program is basically the same kind of thing as identifying a human being with an immaterial soul—both are wrong, and in basically the same way and for the same reasons, but there is something right that both are getting at. Again, I am quite sure Eliezer would feel offended by this comparison, despite its accuracy.
The same thing is true of TDT—it is basically in agreement with a form of virtue theory or deontological ethics. But since Eliezer came to his conclusion via utilitarianism, he thinks he is right and the others are wrong. In reality they are both right, but the other people were right first.
Of course this happens a bit differently with communities than it does with individuals and individual claims. I used individuals in these examples because the situation is clearer there, but there is an analagous situation with communities. This might be a selective effect—a community preserves its own existence by emphasizing its difference with others. Consider how diverse languages develops. Naturally there would just be a continuum of languages, with the people in the middle speaking something intermediate between the people on the two ends. But larger breaks happen because people say, “we don’t talk like those fellows on the other side of the fence.” In the same way communities preserve their existence by emphasizing how bad the other communities are.
The fact that I do not want to do this means that I cannot fit well into any community.