inductive biases are more like a human’s than an ideal Bayesian reasoner’s
Check out this post by Vladimir Nesov: “The problem of choosing Bayesian priors is in general the problem of formalizing preference, it can’t be solved completely without considering utility, without formalizing values, and values are very complicated. No simple morality, no simple probability.” Of course, having a human prior doesn’t necessitate being human-like… Or does it? Duh duh duh.
Today I’d rather say that we don’t know if “priors” is a fundamentally meaningful decision-theoretic idea, and so discussing what does or doesn’t determine it would be premature.
Check out this post by Vladimir Nesov: “The problem of choosing Bayesian priors is in general the problem of formalizing preference, it can’t be solved completely without considering utility, without formalizing values, and values are very complicated. No simple morality, no simple probability.” Of course, having a human prior doesn’t necessitate being human-like… Or does it? Duh duh duh.
Today I’d rather say that we don’t know if “priors” is a fundamentally meaningful decision-theoretic idea, and so discussing what does or doesn’t determine it would be premature.