Yes, Dennett denies that there are qualia in the sense he’s arguing against (and in this, he disagrees with many other philosophers). But does he deny that there are “individual instances of subjective, conscious experience”? Well, he denies that there are such things in fact, but not that there are such things heterophenomenologically. As I said, his position is nuanced. (See also the bit about “fatigues”.) However, on the definition I cited in the top-level comment of this thread, Dennett does not deny the existence of qualia.
Yes, Dennett denies that there are qualia in the sense he’s arguing against (and in this, he disagrees with many other philosophers). But does he deny that there are “individual instances of subjective, conscious experience”? Well, he denies that there are such things in fact, but not that there are such things heterophenomenologically. As I said, his position is nuanced. (See also the bit about “fatigues”.) However, on the definition I cited in the top-level comment of this thread, Dennett does not deny the existence of qualia.