Another thing to consider regarding dreams is: Insects and fish don’t have dreams (I wonder if maybe it only is mammals and some birds that do).
As humans, we make motivational tradeoffs based on pain (“should I go out and freeze in the cold to feed my hunger?”, etc). And we change long-term behaviors based on pain (“earlier when I went there, I experienced pain, so I’d rather avoid that in the future”). And both of these things I just mentioned, are also observed among lobsters (as explained in the embedded video).
Something else that lobsters do and we also do: They change behavior (and body language) based on how “alpha” and “beta” they feel. As explained here at 1:21. And as humans we experience that our “qualia” can be tinged by such feelings.
So all animals that dream make motivational tradeoffs based on pain. But not all animals that make motivational tradeoffs based on pain have dreams.
Some hazy speculation from me: Maybe the feeling of pain is more “basic” (shared by older evolutionary ancestors) than some of the cognitive machinery that dreams help us maintain.
Here are some unorganized thoughts I have (these are related to your top-level post, but I’m including them here nonetheless):
Note the difference between cognitive tradeoffs and more simple mechanisms like “if bodily damage then scream”. If you think of consciousness as relating to a “non-local workspace” or something like that, then making tradeoffs seems like something that maybe could qualify.
It’s interesting to note that fish and lobsters rub painful parts of their body, and that anesthesia can make them stop doing that.
Many animals are social animals. For some examples of how fish can be social in sophisticated ways, see e.g. here. I have also heard it claimed that cockroaches are quite social animals. On Wikipedia they write: “Some species, such as the gregarious German cockroach, have an elaborate social structure involving common shelter, social dependence, information transfer and kin recognition (...) When reared in isolation, German cockroaches show behavior that is different from behavior when reared in a group. In one study, isolated cockroaches were less likely to leave their shelters and explore, spent less time eating, interacted less with conspecifics when exposed to them, and took longer to recognize receptive females. These effects might have been due either to reduced metabolic and developmental rates in isolated individuals or the fact that the isolated individuals had not had a training period to learn about what others were like via their antennae. Individual American cockroaches appear to have consistently different “personalities” regarding how they seek shelter. In addition, group personality is not simply the sum of individual choices, but reflects conformity and collective decision-making.”.
Many animals have language, including birds and fish and insects. (Or are we to only call something language if we can build complex phrases as humans do? If so, I think human children start reporting suffering before they have learned to properly speak or understand “language”.)
Admittedly non-toddler humans have a wider repertoire than other animals when it comes to reporting and describing suffering. Maybe that constitutes a qualitative leap of some kind, but I suspect that various other animals also can communicate in considerable nuance about how they feel.
Jeffrey Masson about pigs: “Piglets are particularly fond of play, just as human children are, and chase one another, play-fight, play-love, tumble down hills, and generally engage in a wide variety of enjoyable activities. (...) Though they are often fed garbage and eat it, their food choices—if allowed them—would not be dissimilar to our own. They get easily bored with the same food. They love melons, bananas, and apples, but if they are fed them for several days on end, they will set them aside and eat whatever other food is new first. (...) Much like humans, every single pig is an individual. (...) Some pigs are independent and tough, and don’t let the bad times get to them. Others are ultra-sensitive and succumb to sadness and even depression much more readily.”. Here is a video of what seems like a pig trying to help another pig.
I posit/guess/assume: Pain is often connected enough with language that we are able to report on how we feel using language—but also often not.
I posit/guess/assume: There are things that humans use suffering for that don’t rely on language, and that would work and be useful without language and is used the same way by evolutionary ancestors of ours that are fish/insects/etc.
I do find it a bit weird that we have so much consciousness, as this seems (based on gut feeling) like something that would be ineffective (use unnecessary energy). It seems that you have a similar intuition. But the resolution of this “paradox” that seems most plausible to me, is that for whatever reason evolution has made animals that use “conscious” processes for a lot of things. Calculators are more efficient than human brains at arithmetic, but nonetheless, humans often use “conscious” processes even for simple arithmetic. Why assume that it’s any different for e.g. crows when they do arithmetic, or when they come up with creative plans based on spatial visualization?
Bees are influenced by “emotion” in ways that overlap with how humans are influenced by emotion. And even springtails sometimes have behavior that seems somewhat sophisticated (see e.g. this mating ritual, which seems more complicated to me than “body damage registered, move away”).
Here is an example of fish acting as if they have an appreciation for visual sights. Humans also act as if they have an appreciation for visual sights. And so do bears it would seem. If e.g. your 1st cousin says “what a beautiful view”, you assume that he has evolved conscious processes that appreciate beauty (just like you). It would after all be weird if different evolutionary mechanisms had evolved for the two of you. The more evolutionary distance there is between someone, the weaker this kind of argument becomes, but I still think a good deal of it is left for distant cousins such as fish and bears.
I don’t disagree with “Conscious’ is incredibly complicated and weird. We have no idea how to build it.”. But you could also say “Lobsters are incredibly complicated and weird. We have no idea how to build a lobster.”
Reducing the risk of being singled out by predators can be an evolutionary disincentive against giving overt signals of pain/hunger/etc.
Another thing to consider regarding dreams is: Insects and fish don’t have dreams (I wonder if maybe it only is mammals and some birds that do).
As humans, we make motivational tradeoffs based on pain (“should I go out and freeze in the cold to feed my hunger?”, etc). And we change long-term behaviors based on pain (“earlier when I went there, I experienced pain, so I’d rather avoid that in the future”). And both of these things I just mentioned, are also observed among lobsters (as explained in the embedded video).
Something else that lobsters do and we also do: They change behavior (and body language) based on how “alpha” and “beta” they feel. As explained here at 1:21. And as humans we experience that our “qualia” can be tinged by such feelings.
So all animals that dream make motivational tradeoffs based on pain. But not all animals that make motivational tradeoffs based on pain have dreams.
Some hazy speculation from me: Maybe the feeling of pain is more “basic” (shared by older evolutionary ancestors) than some of the cognitive machinery that dreams help us maintain.
Here are some unorganized thoughts I have (these are related to your top-level post, but I’m including them here nonetheless):
Note the difference between cognitive tradeoffs and more simple mechanisms like “if bodily damage then scream”. If you think of consciousness as relating to a “non-local workspace” or something like that, then making tradeoffs seems like something that maybe could qualify.
It’s interesting to note that fish and lobsters rub painful parts of their body, and that anesthesia can make them stop doing that.
Many animals are social animals. For some examples of how fish can be social in sophisticated ways, see e.g. here. I have also heard it claimed that cockroaches are quite social animals. On Wikipedia they write: “Some species, such as the gregarious German cockroach, have an elaborate social structure involving common shelter, social dependence, information transfer and kin recognition (...) When reared in isolation, German cockroaches show behavior that is different from behavior when reared in a group. In one study, isolated cockroaches were less likely to leave their shelters and explore, spent less time eating, interacted less with conspecifics when exposed to them, and took longer to recognize receptive females. These effects might have been due either to reduced metabolic and developmental rates in isolated individuals or the fact that the isolated individuals had not had a training period to learn about what others were like via their antennae. Individual American cockroaches appear to have consistently different “personalities” regarding how they seek shelter. In addition, group personality is not simply the sum of individual choices, but reflects conformity and collective decision-making.”.
Many animals have language, including birds and fish and insects. (Or are we to only call something language if we can build complex phrases as humans do? If so, I think human children start reporting suffering before they have learned to properly speak or understand “language”.)
Admittedly non-toddler humans have a wider repertoire than other animals when it comes to reporting and describing suffering. Maybe that constitutes a qualitative leap of some kind, but I suspect that various other animals also can communicate in considerable nuance about how they feel.
Jeffrey Masson about pigs: “Piglets are particularly fond of play, just as human children are, and chase one another, play-fight, play-love, tumble down hills, and generally engage in a wide variety of enjoyable activities. (...) Though they are often fed garbage and eat it, their food choices—if allowed them—would not be dissimilar to our own. They get easily bored with the same food. They love melons, bananas, and apples, but if they are fed them for several days on end, they will set them aside and eat whatever other food is new first. (...) Much like humans, every single pig is an individual. (...) Some pigs are independent and tough, and don’t let the bad times get to them. Others are ultra-sensitive and succumb to sadness and even depression much more readily.”. Here is a video of what seems like a pig trying to help another pig.
I posit/guess/assume: Pain is often connected enough with language that we are able to report on how we feel using language—but also often not.
I posit/guess/assume: There are things that humans use suffering for that don’t rely on language, and that would work and be useful without language and is used the same way by evolutionary ancestors of ours that are fish/insects/etc.
I do find it a bit weird that we have so much consciousness, as this seems (based on gut feeling) like something that would be ineffective (use unnecessary energy). It seems that you have a similar intuition. But the resolution of this “paradox” that seems most plausible to me, is that for whatever reason evolution has made animals that use “conscious” processes for a lot of things. Calculators are more efficient than human brains at arithmetic, but nonetheless, humans often use “conscious” processes even for simple arithmetic. Why assume that it’s any different for e.g. crows when they do arithmetic, or when they come up with creative plans based on spatial visualization?
Bees are influenced by “emotion” in ways that overlap with how humans are influenced by emotion. And even springtails sometimes have behavior that seems somewhat sophisticated (see e.g. this mating ritual, which seems more complicated to me than “body damage registered, move away”).
Here is an example of fish acting as if they have an appreciation for visual sights. Humans also act as if they have an appreciation for visual sights. And so do bears it would seem. If e.g. your 1st cousin says “what a beautiful view”, you assume that he has evolved conscious processes that appreciate beauty (just like you). It would after all be weird if different evolutionary mechanisms had evolved for the two of you. The more evolutionary distance there is between someone, the weaker this kind of argument becomes, but I still think a good deal of it is left for distant cousins such as fish and bears.
I don’t disagree with “Conscious’ is incredibly complicated and weird. We have no idea how to build it.”. But you could also say “Lobsters are incredibly complicated and weird. We have no idea how to build a lobster.”
Reducing the risk of being singled out by predators can be an evolutionary disincentive against giving overt signals of pain/hunger/etc.