Such proof-of-stake seems like a prohibitive friction cost and would prevent many legitimate authors from publishing, and many illegitimate authors honestly believe that their work will replicate, and many legitimate authors’ work fails to replicate anyway. The analogy to proof-of-stake (in the original post) is inexact, it’s closer to proof-of-stake in academia.
I’m not exactly sure what you mean, or what the crux is here.
The classical argument for “many illegitimate authors honestly believe that their work will replicate” is that this is then free money that creates disincentives for those authors. The first point I’m more unsure about, but I’m not exactly sure what friction you see there. Is it reputational (e.g. betting on prediction markets seems shady), or not having the money to open up the prediction market/pay replicators? In the second case, you could imagine something like VC/funders for promising researchers/authors, who in turn are incentivized to evaluate the fundees properly.
The analogy to proof-of-stake (in the original post) is inexact, it’s closer to proof-of-stake in academia.
Unsure what you mean exactly. If you’re saying “the stakes the author is talking about is stakes in the academia, so reputations and the like”, I think I agree. But the author seemed to be making a broader point about academia so far working by doing proof-of-work (so you’re spending many useless hours on writing dissertations for a topic that’s not actually going to be relevant for your field), and proof-of-stake not offering an appealing option with the analogy, so I was continuing the analogy to see possibilities that seemed to work well in the abstract.
Such proof-of-stake seems like a prohibitive friction cost and would prevent many legitimate authors from publishing, and many illegitimate authors honestly believe that their work will replicate, and many legitimate authors’ work fails to replicate anyway. The analogy to proof-of-stake (in the original post) is inexact, it’s closer to proof-of-stake in academia.
I’m not exactly sure what you mean, or what the crux is here.
The classical argument for “many illegitimate authors honestly believe that their work will replicate” is that this is then free money that creates disincentives for those authors. The first point I’m more unsure about, but I’m not exactly sure what friction you see there. Is it reputational (e.g. betting on prediction markets seems shady), or not having the money to open up the prediction market/pay replicators? In the second case, you could imagine something like VC/funders for promising researchers/authors, who in turn are incentivized to evaluate the fundees properly.
Unsure what you mean exactly. If you’re saying “the stakes the author is talking about is stakes in the academia, so reputations and the like”, I think I agree. But the author seemed to be making a broader point about academia so far working by doing proof-of-work (so you’re spending many useless hours on writing dissertations for a topic that’s not actually going to be relevant for your field), and proof-of-stake not offering an appealing option with the analogy, so I was continuing the analogy to see possibilities that seemed to work well in the abstract.