The “maps all the way down” does not explain why there is (an illusion of) a reality that all these maps are about. If there is no underlying reality, why aren’t the maps completely arbitrary?
The criticism Aella is making is substantively different than “reality isn’t real”.
So, imagine you’re god. All of reality takes place in your mind; reality is literally just a thought you had. How does Eliezer’s concept of “truth” work in that case?
Suppose you’re mentally ill. How much should you trust something that claims to be a mind? Is it possible for imaginary things to surprise you? What does truth mean, if your interface to the “external world”/”reality” isn’t reliable?
Suppose you’re lucid dreaming. Does the notion of “truth” stop existing?
(But also, even if there is no underlying reality, the maps still aren’t going to be completely arbitrary, because a mind has a shape of its own.)
So, imagine you’re god. All of reality takes place in your mind; reality is literally just a thought you had. How does Eliezer’s concept of “truth” work in that case?
Then the god’s mind would be the reality; god’s psychological traits would be the new “laws of physics”, kind of.
I admit I have a problem imagining “thoughts” without also imagining a mind. The mechanism that implements the mind would be the underlying reality.
We can suppose that the god is just observing what happens when a particular mathematical equation runs; that is, the universe can, in a certain sense, be entirely independent of the god’s thoughts and psychological traits.
Independence might be close enough to “external” for the “external world” concept to apply; so we can evaluate reality as independent from, even for argument’s sake external to, the god’s mind, even though it exists within it.
So we can have truth which is analogous to Eliezer’s truth.
Now, the question is—does the “external world” and “independence” actually add anything?
Well, suppose that the god can and does alter things; observes how the equation is running, and tweaks the data.
Does “truth” only exist with respect to the parts of this world that the god hasn’t changed? Are the only “true” parts of this reality the parts that are purely the results of the original equation? If the god makes one adjustment ever, is truth forever contaminated?
Okay, let’s define the external world to be the equation itself. The god can choose which equation to run, can adjust the parameters; where exactly in this process does truth itself lay? Maybe in the mathematics used to run the equation? But mathematics is arbitrary; the god can alter the mathematics.
Well, up to a point, the point Aella points at as “consistency.” So there’s that piece; the truth has to at least be consistent. And I think I appreciate the “truth” of the universe that isn’t altered; there’s consistency there, too.
Which leaves the other part, experience.
Suppose, for a moment, we are insane (independently, just imagine being insane); the external reality you observe is illusory. Does that diminish the value of what we consider to be the truth in anticipating our experiences? If this is all a grand illusion—well, it’s quite a consistent illusion, and I know what will happen when I engage in the experience I refer to when I say I drop an apple. I call the illusion ‘reality’, and it exists, regardless of whether or not it satisfies the aesthetic ideal I have for what “existence” should actually mean.
Which is to say—it doesn’t matter if I am living in reality, or in a god’s mathematical equation, or in a fantasy. The existence or nonexistence of an external reality has no bearing on whether or not I expect an apple to hit the ground when I let go of it; the existence or nonexistence of an external reality has no bearing on whether the apple will do so. Whether the apple exists in the real world, or as a concept in my mind, it has a particular set of consistent behaviors, which I experience in a particular way.
The “maps all the way down” does not explain why there is (an illusion of) a reality that all these maps are about. If there is no underlying reality, why aren’t the maps completely arbitrary?
The criticism Aella is making is substantively different than “reality isn’t real”.
So, imagine you’re god. All of reality takes place in your mind; reality is literally just a thought you had. How does Eliezer’s concept of “truth” work in that case?
Suppose you’re mentally ill. How much should you trust something that claims to be a mind? Is it possible for imaginary things to surprise you? What does truth mean, if your interface to the “external world”/”reality” isn’t reliable?
Suppose you’re lucid dreaming. Does the notion of “truth” stop existing?
(But also, even if there is no underlying reality, the maps still aren’t going to be completely arbitrary, because a mind has a shape of its own.)
Then the god’s mind would be the reality; god’s psychological traits would be the new “laws of physics”, kind of.
I admit I have a problem imagining “thoughts” without also imagining a mind. The mechanism that implements the mind would be the underlying reality.
We can suppose that the god is just observing what happens when a particular mathematical equation runs; that is, the universe can, in a certain sense, be entirely independent of the god’s thoughts and psychological traits.
Independence might be close enough to “external” for the “external world” concept to apply; so we can evaluate reality as independent from, even for argument’s sake external to, the god’s mind, even though it exists within it.
So we can have truth which is analogous to Eliezer’s truth.
Now, the question is—does the “external world” and “independence” actually add anything?
Well, suppose that the god can and does alter things; observes how the equation is running, and tweaks the data.
Does “truth” only exist with respect to the parts of this world that the god hasn’t changed? Are the only “true” parts of this reality the parts that are purely the results of the original equation? If the god makes one adjustment ever, is truth forever contaminated?
Okay, let’s define the external world to be the equation itself. The god can choose which equation to run, can adjust the parameters; where exactly in this process does truth itself lay? Maybe in the mathematics used to run the equation? But mathematics is arbitrary; the god can alter the mathematics.
Well, up to a point, the point Aella points at as “consistency.” So there’s that piece; the truth has to at least be consistent. And I think I appreciate the “truth” of the universe that isn’t altered; there’s consistency there, too.
Which leaves the other part, experience.
Suppose, for a moment, we are insane (independently, just imagine being insane); the external reality you observe is illusory. Does that diminish the value of what we consider to be the truth in anticipating our experiences? If this is all a grand illusion—well, it’s quite a consistent illusion, and I know what will happen when I engage in the experience I refer to when I say I drop an apple. I call the illusion ‘reality’, and it exists, regardless of whether or not it satisfies the aesthetic ideal I have for what “existence” should actually mean.
Which is to say—it doesn’t matter if I am living in reality, or in a god’s mathematical equation, or in a fantasy. The existence or nonexistence of an external reality has no bearing on whether or not I expect an apple to hit the ground when I let go of it; the existence or nonexistence of an external reality has no bearing on whether the apple will do so. Whether the apple exists in the real world, or as a concept in my mind, it has a particular set of consistent behaviors, which I experience in a particular way.