How subject ethical intuitions should be to rational analysis (in the sense of being changed by them) depends on how much you endorse the fact-value distinction and how fundamental the intuition is.
Reason leads me (though perhaps my reasoning is flawed) to conclude that “others’ abject suffering is bad” isn’t any more justified a desire than “others’ abject suffering is good;” they’re as equivalent as a preference for chocolate or vanilla ice cream. But so what? I don’t abandon my preference for vanilla just because it doesn’t follow from reason. Morality works the same way, except that ideally, I care about it enough to force my preferences on others.
How subject ethical intuitions should be to rational analysis (in the sense of being changed by them) depends on how much you endorse the fact-value distinction and how fundamental the intuition is.
Yes. It is non-terminal ethical intuitions that I expect to be updated. “Should not do X because Y” should be discarded when it becomes obvious that Y is bullshit.
How subject ethical intuitions should be to rational analysis (in the sense of being changed by them) depends on how much you endorse the fact-value distinction and how fundamental the intuition is.
Reason leads me (though perhaps my reasoning is flawed) to conclude that “others’ abject suffering is bad” isn’t any more justified a desire than “others’ abject suffering is good;” they’re as equivalent as a preference for chocolate or vanilla ice cream. But so what? I don’t abandon my preference for vanilla just because it doesn’t follow from reason. Morality works the same way, except that ideally, I care about it enough to force my preferences on others.
Yes. It is non-terminal ethical intuitions that I expect to be updated. “Should not do X because Y” should be discarded when it becomes obvious that Y is bullshit.