The problem with it, it seems to me, is that this is a good explanation for why qualia are ineffable, but it doesn’t seem to be come any close to explaining what they are or how they arise.
You’re right. But I believe that that the ineffable aspect is closely related to the other two questions, although I don’t have an answer in the same detail as the ineffability question (which would still be progress!).
To give a sketch of what I have in mind, my best explanation is this: conscious minds form when a subsystem is able to screen itself off from the entropizing forces of the environment (similar in kind to a refrigerator or other control system). This necessarily decouples it from the patterns that exist in the environment, as well as other minds that have done the same.
So the formation of a conscious mind will coincide with the formation of incompatible encoding methods, unless special care is taken to ensure that the encoding protcols are the same. Therefore, we shouldn’t be surprised to notice that, “hey, everything that’s conscious, also has ineffable experiences with the other conscious things.”
But again, I don’t claim this part is as well-developed or thought-out.
You’re right. But I believe that that the ineffable aspect is closely related to the other two questions, although I don’t have an answer in the same detail as the ineffability question (which would still be progress!).
To give a sketch of what I have in mind, my best explanation is this: conscious minds form when a subsystem is able to screen itself off from the entropizing forces of the environment (similar in kind to a refrigerator or other control system). This necessarily decouples it from the patterns that exist in the environment, as well as other minds that have done the same.
So the formation of a conscious mind will coincide with the formation of incompatible encoding methods, unless special care is taken to ensure that the encoding protcols are the same. Therefore, we shouldn’t be surprised to notice that, “hey, everything that’s conscious, also has ineffable experiences with the other conscious things.”
But again, I don’t claim this part is as well-developed or thought-out.