Intuitions don’t matter. If Mary can’t activate her neural pathways participating in creation of experience of seeing red, then she has no means of knowing how she will experience redness. All models she can create in her mind will be external to her as the mind created by actions of human being in Chinese room is external to that human being.
And this limitation of our conscious understanding feels to us like a thing we have which cannot in principle be reduced.
It is not only conscious understanding that is required, we will need a conscious control of individual neurons and synapses to be able to experience qualia given just a description of it. For example, to be able to name color and imagine color given its name, Mary (roughly speaking) should manually connect neurons in her visual cortex to the neurons in her Broca’s area and to the neurons in her auditory cortex.
So I think that, contrary to Dennet, Mary will get new information when she will see colors, as human’s brain construction doesn’t allow to acquire that information by other means. Thus in a sense human’s qualia cannot be reduced.
That contradicts one of the assumptions in the thought experiment. You’re establishing qualia as a physical property; in that case, “what it feels like to see red” is amongst the things Mary knows about, by hypothesis.
Also, if it just comes down to activating those neurons, then Mary knows that too and can perform an experiment to activate those neurons without having a ‘red thing’ in front of her, using her incredible superhuman intelligence and resources.
I am not establishing qualia as physical properties of brain’s activity, I think of them as descriptions of specific neural activity in the terms of human’s self-model. And limitations of that self-model (it’s not sufficiently detailed to refer to individual neurons) don’t allow to establish unambiguous correspondence between physical description of brain and self-model description of brain within that self-model.
Mary knows that too and can perform an experiment to activate those neurons without having a ‘red thing’ in front of her, using her incredible superhuman intelligence and resources.
And what is a difference between seeing red thing and activation of those neurons? The point of “Mary’s room” is to know what seeing red means without actually seeing it.
And what is a difference between seeing red thing and activation of those neurons? The point of “Mary’s room” is to know what seeing red means without actually seeing it.
Depends who’s using it. For Dennett, for instance, the point of Mary’s room is to point out how ridiculous this notion of qualia is, or at least how silly the thought experiment is.
As stated, she knows everything physical about red. So she knows, for instance, how to build a machine that will activate her red-seeing neurons in the absence of the color. Also as stated, she can perform whatever experiments she needs to in order to become an expert color scientist. So she can have whatever experience would come from having those neurons activated.
If you think there’s nothing else to the experience, then I think we’re in agreement so far.
Intuitions don’t matter. If Mary can’t activate her neural pathways participating in creation of experience of seeing red, then she has no means of knowing how she will experience redness. All models she can create in her mind will be external to her as the mind created by actions of human being in Chinese room is external to that human being.
It is not only conscious understanding that is required, we will need a conscious control of individual neurons and synapses to be able to experience qualia given just a description of it. For example, to be able to name color and imagine color given its name, Mary (roughly speaking) should manually connect neurons in her visual cortex to the neurons in her Broca’s area and to the neurons in her auditory cortex.
So I think that, contrary to Dennet, Mary will get new information when she will see colors, as human’s brain construction doesn’t allow to acquire that information by other means. Thus in a sense human’s qualia cannot be reduced.
You may be interested in this paper which makes a similar argument.
Thanks. It is identical argument modulo my inability to make all reasoning and premises sufficiently transparent.
That contradicts one of the assumptions in the thought experiment. You’re establishing qualia as a physical property; in that case, “what it feels like to see red” is amongst the things Mary knows about, by hypothesis.
Also, if it just comes down to activating those neurons, then Mary knows that too and can perform an experiment to activate those neurons without having a ‘red thing’ in front of her, using her incredible superhuman intelligence and resources.
I am not establishing qualia as physical properties of brain’s activity, I think of them as descriptions of specific neural activity in the terms of human’s self-model. And limitations of that self-model (it’s not sufficiently detailed to refer to individual neurons) don’t allow to establish unambiguous correspondence between physical description of brain and self-model description of brain within that self-model.
And what is a difference between seeing red thing and activation of those neurons? The point of “Mary’s room” is to know what seeing red means without actually seeing it.
Depends who’s using it. For Dennett, for instance, the point of Mary’s room is to point out how ridiculous this notion of qualia is, or at least how silly the thought experiment is.
As stated, she knows everything physical about red. So she knows, for instance, how to build a machine that will activate her red-seeing neurons in the absence of the color. Also as stated, she can perform whatever experiments she needs to in order to become an expert color scientist. So she can have whatever experience would come from having those neurons activated.
If you think there’s nothing else to the experience, then I think we’re in agreement so far.