There are also some less-traditional paths-to-lose:
Your cryopreservation subscription fees prevent you from buying something else that ends up saving your life (or someone else’s)
You would never die anyway, so your cryopreservation fees only cost pre-singularity utilons from you (or others you would have given the money to).
Simulation is possible, but it is for some reason much “thinner” than reality; that is, a given simulation, even as it runs on a computer existing in a quantum MWI, follows only a very limited number of quantum branches, so has a tiny impact on the measure of the set of future happy versions of you (smaller even than the plain old non-technological-quantum-immortality versions who simply didn’t happen to die).
You are resurrected by a future UFAI in a hell-world. For instance, in order to get one working version of you, the UFAI must create many almost-versions which are painfully insane; and its ethics say that’s OK. And it does this to all corpsicles it finds but not to any other dead people.
I have strong opinions of the likeliness of these (I’d put one at p>99% and another at p<1%) but in any case they’re worth mentioning.
Hmm, regarding quantum immortality, I did think about it. Taken to its extreme, I could perform quantum suicide while tying the result of the quantum draw to the lottery. Then it occurred to me that the vast majority of worlds, in which I did not win the lottery, would contain one more sad mother. Such a situation scores far lower in my utility function than the status quo does.
I feel I should treat quantum suicide by cryostination the same way. The only problem is that the status quo bias works against me this time.
Sorry: I edited the comment you were responding to to clarify my intended meaning, and now perhaps the (unintended?) idea you were responding to is no longer there.
There are also some less-traditional paths-to-lose:
Your cryopreservation subscription fees prevent you from buying something else that ends up saving your life (or someone else’s)
You would never die anyway, so your cryopreservation fees only cost pre-singularity utilons from you (or others you would have given the money to).
Simulation is possible, but it is for some reason much “thinner” than reality; that is, a given simulation, even as it runs on a computer existing in a quantum MWI, follows only a very limited number of quantum branches, so has a tiny impact on the measure of the set of future happy versions of you (smaller even than the plain old non-technological-quantum-immortality versions who simply didn’t happen to die).
You are resurrected by a future UFAI in a hell-world. For instance, in order to get one working version of you, the UFAI must create many almost-versions which are painfully insane; and its ethics say that’s OK. And it does this to all corpsicles it finds but not to any other dead people.
I have strong opinions of the likeliness of these (I’d put one at p>99% and another at p<1%) but in any case they’re worth mentioning.
Hmm, regarding quantum immortality, I did think about it. Taken to its extreme, I could perform quantum suicide while tying the result of the quantum draw to the lottery. Then it occurred to me that the vast majority of worlds, in which I did not win the lottery, would contain one more sad mother. Such a situation scores far lower in my utility function than the status quo does.
I feel I should treat quantum suicide by cryostination the same way. The only problem is that the status quo bias works against me this time.
Sorry: I edited the comment you were responding to to clarify my intended meaning, and now perhaps the (unintended?) idea you were responding to is no longer there.