I think that many negative comments here are missing the point of what Scott Aaronson is doing: If I understand correctly, he is not attempting to formulate a normative theory of morality, but rather a descriptive theory of morality: an attempt to scientifically explain our moral intuitions.
I think that his attempt probably incomplete, since it fails to explain our intuitions in various important scenarios, a fact that he recognizes. But it seems to me that the framework of explaining moral intuitions from mathematical properties of the social network holds merit.
No, I don’t think I got it backwards. “Descriptive” means “what is” (as opposed to “what should be”). Assigning labels, choosing interpretations, deriving meaning—these are all parts of “descriptive” theories. And here the issue is precisely with that.
I think that many negative comments here are missing the point of what Scott Aaronson is doing:
If I understand correctly, he is not attempting to formulate a normative theory of morality, but rather a descriptive theory of morality: an attempt to scientifically explain our moral intuitions.
I think that his attempt probably incomplete, since it fails to explain our intuitions in various important scenarios, a fact that he recognizes. But it seems to me that the framework of explaining moral intuitions from mathematical properties of the social network holds merit.
So, do you see there anything more than morality == popularity? Moral is whatever the majority does?
No, you got it backwards. “Descriptive” means that whatever the majority thinks is described as prevailing mor[e|al]s.
No, I don’t think I got it backwards. “Descriptive” means “what is” (as opposed to “what should be”). Assigning labels, choosing interpretations, deriving meaning—these are all parts of “descriptive” theories. And here the issue is precisely with that.