“Even after we know, we’ll be left with a remaining question—is that how we should calculate should-ness? So it’s not just a matter of sheer factual reductionism, it’s a moral question.”
I think that fits a different pattern. Specifcally the whole epiphenomenalism/pzombie thing.
If I actually fully understood everything about how the brain generates that sense of shouldness, not just some qualitative evolutionary history of why it might be there… ie, if I knew how to build that feeling out of toothpicks and rubber bands and fully understood why what I did did what it did, then I’d actually genuinely understand something I really don’t understand now, and that understanding may, itself, tell me something about why I, ahem, should or shouldn’t accept that particular computation of shouldness.
“Even after we know, we’ll be left with a remaining question—is that how we should calculate should-ness? So it’s not just a matter of sheer factual reductionism, it’s a moral question.”
I think that fits a different pattern. Specifcally the whole epiphenomenalism/pzombie thing.
If I actually fully understood everything about how the brain generates that sense of shouldness, not just some qualitative evolutionary history of why it might be there… ie, if I knew how to build that feeling out of toothpicks and rubber bands and fully understood why what I did did what it did, then I’d actually genuinely understand something I really don’t understand now, and that understanding may, itself, tell me something about why I, ahem, should or shouldn’t accept that particular computation of shouldness.