an entity whose terminal values are inconsistent with my continued existence
Indeed, but in the larger scheme of possible universe tiling agent space, Clippy and us don’t look so different. Clippy would tile the universe with computronium doing something like recursively simulating universes tiled with paperclips. We would likely tile the universe with computronium simulating lots of fun-having post-humans.
It’s a software difference, not a hardware difference, and it would be easy to propose ways for us and Clippy to cooperate (such as Clippy commits to dedicating x% of resources to simulating post-humans if he tiles the universe, and we commit to dedicating y% of resources to simulating paperclips if we tile the universe).
Clippy would tile the universe with computronium doing something like recursively simulating universes tiled with paperclips.
That is an interesting claim. I would be surprised to find that Clippy was content with simulated clips. Humans seem more likely to be satisfied with simulation than paperclippers. We identify ourselves by our thoughts.
Well, no, he’s not just happy with simulated paperclips. The computronium he would tile is paperclip shaped, and presumably better to have that paperclipcomputronium simulating paperclips than anything else?
presumably better to have that paperclipcomputronium simulating paperclips than anything else?
Given that Clippy makes computronium at all, sure, but computronium is probably less efficient than some other non-work-performing material at forming paperclips.
Indeed, but in the larger scheme of possible universe tiling agent space, Clippy and us don’t look so different. Clippy would tile the universe with computronium doing something like recursively simulating universes tiled with paperclips. We would likely tile the universe with computronium simulating lots of fun-having post-humans.
It’s a software difference, not a hardware difference, and it would be easy to propose ways for us and Clippy to cooperate (such as Clippy commits to dedicating x% of resources to simulating post-humans if he tiles the universe, and we commit to dedicating y% of resources to simulating paperclips if we tile the universe).
That is an interesting claim. I would be surprised to find that Clippy was content with simulated clips. Humans seem more likely to be satisfied with simulation than paperclippers. We identify ourselves by our thoughts.
Well, no, he’s not just happy with simulated paperclips. The computronium he would tile is paperclip shaped, and presumably better to have that paperclipcomputronium simulating paperclips than anything else?
Given that Clippy makes computronium at all, sure, but computronium is probably less efficient than some other non-work-performing material at forming paperclips.
Well, you know him better than I! You have a business relationship and all.