I get your point – explaining why things feel the specific way they do is the key difficulty, and it’s fair to say this model doesn’t fully crack it. Instead of ignoring it though, this article tries a different angle: what if the feeling is the functional signature arising within the self-model? It’s proposing an identity, not just a correlation. (And yeah, fair point on the original ‘debunking’ title – the framing has been adjusted!).
That seems very possible to me, and if and when we can show whether something like that is the case, I do think it would represent significant progress. If nothing else, it would help tell us what the thing we need to be examining actually is, in a way we don’t currently have an easy way to specify.
I get your point – explaining why things feel the specific way they do is the key difficulty, and it’s fair to say this model doesn’t fully crack it. Instead of ignoring it though, this article tries a different angle: what if the feeling is the functional signature arising within the self-model? It’s proposing an identity, not just a correlation. (And yeah, fair point on the original ‘debunking’ title – the framing has been adjusted!).
That seems very possible to me, and if and when we can show whether something like that is the case, I do think it would represent significant progress. If nothing else, it would help tell us what the thing we need to be examining actually is, in a way we don’t currently have an easy way to specify.