Are there any LW-rationalist-vetted philosophical papers on this theme in modern times?
I’m not sure what is required for a philosophical paper to be deemed “LW-rationalist-vetted”, nor am I sure why that is a desirable feature for a paper to have. But I will state that, IMHO, an approach based on “naturalistic ethics”, like that of Binmore is at least as rational as any ethical approach based on some kind of utilitarianism.
I would say that a naturalistic approach to ethics assumes, with Hume, that fundamental values are not universal—they may certainly vary by species, for example, and also by the historical accidents of genetics, birth-culture, etc. However, meta-ethics is rationally based and universal, and can be converged upon by a process of reflective equilibrium.
As to instrumental values—those turn out to be universal in the sense that (in the limit of perfect rationality and low-cost communication) they will be the same for everyone in the ethical community at a given time. However, they will not be universal in the sense that they will be the same for all conceivable communities in the multiverse. Instrumental values will depend on the makeup of the community, because the common community values are derived as a kind of compromise among the idiosyncratic fundamental values of the community members. Instrumental values will also depend upon the community’s beliefs—regarding expected consequences of actions, expected utilities of outcomes, and even regarding the expected future composition of the community. And, since the community learns (i.e. changes its beliefs), instrumental values must inevitably change a little with time.
I’m somewhat skeptical of the idea that there isn’t a universal morality (relative to some generalized Occamian prior-like-thing) that even a paperclip maximizer would converge to …
As an intuition pump, I’ll claim that Clippy could fit right in to a community of mostly human rationalists, all in agreement on the naturalist meta-ethics. In that community, Clippy would act in accordance with the community’s instrumental values (which will include both the manufacture of paperclips and other, more idiosyncratically human values). Clippy will know that more paper clips are produced by the community than Clippy could produce on his own if he were not a community member. And the community welcomes Clippy, because he contributes to the satisfaction of the fundamental values of other community members—through his command of metallurgy and mechanical engineering, for example.
The aspect of naturalistic ethics which many people find distasteful is that the community will contribute to the satisfaction of your fundamental values only to the extent that you contribute to the satisfaction of the fundamental values of other community members. So, the fundamental values of the weak and powerless tend to get less weight in the collective instrumental value system than do the fundamental values of the strong and powerful. Of course, this does not mean that the very young and the elderly get mistreated—it is rational to contribute now to those who have contributed in the past or who will contribute in the future. And many humans will include concern for the weak among their fundamental values—so the community will have to respect those values.
I’m not sure what is required for a philosophical paper to be deemed “LW-rationalist-vetted”, nor am I sure why that is a desirable feature for a paper to have. But I will state that, IMHO, an approach based on “naturalistic ethics”, like that of Binmore is at least as rational as any ethical approach based on some kind of utilitarianism.
I would say that a naturalistic approach to ethics assumes, with Hume, that fundamental values are not universal—they may certainly vary by species, for example, and also by the historical accidents of genetics, birth-culture, etc. However, meta-ethics is rationally based and universal, and can be converged upon by a process of reflective equilibrium.
As to instrumental values—those turn out to be universal in the sense that (in the limit of perfect rationality and low-cost communication) they will be the same for everyone in the ethical community at a given time. However, they will not be universal in the sense that they will be the same for all conceivable communities in the multiverse. Instrumental values will depend on the makeup of the community, because the common community values are derived as a kind of compromise among the idiosyncratic fundamental values of the community members. Instrumental values will also depend upon the community’s beliefs—regarding expected consequences of actions, expected utilities of outcomes, and even regarding the expected future composition of the community. And, since the community learns (i.e. changes its beliefs), instrumental values must inevitably change a little with time.
As an intuition pump, I’ll claim that Clippy could fit right in to a community of mostly human rationalists, all in agreement on the naturalist meta-ethics. In that community, Clippy would act in accordance with the community’s instrumental values (which will include both the manufacture of paperclips and other, more idiosyncratically human values). Clippy will know that more paper clips are produced by the community than Clippy could produce on his own if he were not a community member. And the community welcomes Clippy, because he contributes to the satisfaction of the fundamental values of other community members—through his command of metallurgy and mechanical engineering, for example.
The aspect of naturalistic ethics which many people find distasteful is that the community will contribute to the satisfaction of your fundamental values only to the extent that you contribute to the satisfaction of the fundamental values of other community members. So, the fundamental values of the weak and powerless tend to get less weight in the collective instrumental value system than do the fundamental values of the strong and powerful. Of course, this does not mean that the very young and the elderly get mistreated—it is rational to contribute now to those who have contributed in the past or who will contribute in the future. And many humans will include concern for the weak among their fundamental values—so the community will have to respect those values.