All right. My summary: adding further measures to improve the effectiveness of one’s political spending (voting in primaries, publicly conditioning one’s spending on desired behavior through political action organizations, etc), using realistic data-driven probability estimates for the probability of swinging elections, data on legislative behavior, and information on foreign aid effectiveness/corruption raises the expected effectiveness of political action above the direct effects of GWWC and GiveWell’s recommended charities, according to their own criteria (usually DALYs for existing people) using standard decision theory.
However, the indirect effects of giving to the recommended charities publicly as part of the GWWC or GiveWell efforts, e.g. strengthening a culture of efficient philanthropy and inducing others to follow one’s example, complicate the issue.
I will then use the example to make various points about decision theory, sorting out our values, and the efficiency of charitable markets.
All right. My summary: adding further measures to improve the effectiveness of one’s political spending (voting in primaries, publicly conditioning one’s spending on desired behavior through political action organizations, etc), using realistic data-driven probability estimates for the probability of swinging elections, data on legislative behavior, and information on foreign aid effectiveness/corruption raises the expected effectiveness of political action above the direct effects of GWWC and GiveWell’s recommended charities, according to their own criteria (usually DALYs for existing people) using standard decision theory.
However, the indirect effects of giving to the recommended charities publicly as part of the GWWC or GiveWell efforts, e.g. strengthening a culture of efficient philanthropy and inducing others to follow one’s example, complicate the issue.
I will then use the example to make various points about decision theory, sorting out our values, and the efficiency of charitable markets.