Theories of Big Universes or Multiverses abound—Inflation, Many Worlds, mathematical universes etc. Given a certain plausible, naturalistic account of personal identity (that for you to exist merely requires there to be something psychologically continuous with earlier stages of your existence) if any of these theories is true we are immortal (though not necessarily in the pleasant sense).
Questions: Is the argument valid? What are the chances that none of the multiverse theories are true? What, if anything, can we say about the likely character of this afterlife? Are we likely to simply find ourselves in futures where everything has gone right and scientific progress has granted us immortality? Or is our future most likely one of chaotic, disjointed and unintelligible sensory experiences in a Boltzman-fugue state? Do some big universe theories promise better futures than others?
Obviously I’m not expecting anyone to have conclusive thoughts. Speculation and hypothesizing is fine.
I think if you fully taboo the concepts of “personal identity” and “existence”, the argument evaporates. Before tabooing, your argument looks like this:
Alternate universes, containing persons psychologically continuous with me, exist.
Persons psychologically continuous with me are me.
Therefore I am immortal.
Therefore I should anticipate never dying.
Therefore I should make plans that rely on never dying.
On the face of it, it seems sound. But after tabooing, we’re left with something like:
Our best, most parsimonious models of reality refer to unseen alternate universes and unseen persons psychologically continuous with each other.
In such models, alternate futures of a person-moment have no principled way of distinguishing one of themselves as “real”.
Therefore, our models of reality refer to arbitrarily long-lived versions of each person. …
Therefore I have reason to anticipate never dying.
Therefore I have reason to act as if I will never die.
Oh, I should have been more explicit: I think there’s a big logical leap between steps 3 and 4 of the rewritten argument, as indicated by the ellipsis. (Why is our models of reality referring to arbitrarily long-lived versions of each person a reason to act as if I will never die?) It’s far from clear that this gap can be bridged. That’s why I said the argument evaporates.
Theories of Big Universes or Multiverses abound—Inflation, Many Worlds, mathematical universes etc. Given a certain plausible, naturalistic account of personal identity (that for you to exist merely requires there to be something psychologically continuous with earlier stages of your existence) if any of these theories is true we are immortal (though not necessarily in the pleasant sense).
Questions: Is the argument valid? What are the chances that none of the multiverse theories are true? What, if anything, can we say about the likely character of this afterlife? Are we likely to simply find ourselves in futures where everything has gone right and scientific progress has granted us immortality? Or is our future most likely one of chaotic, disjointed and unintelligible sensory experiences in a Boltzman-fugue state? Do some big universe theories promise better futures than others?
Obviously I’m not expecting anyone to have conclusive thoughts. Speculation and hypothesizing is fine.
Only with a usage of “immortal” that abandons the cached thinking and preferences that we usually associate with the term.
I think if you fully taboo the concepts of “personal identity” and “existence”, the argument evaporates. Before tabooing, your argument looks like this:
Alternate universes, containing persons psychologically continuous with me, exist.
Persons psychologically continuous with me are me.
Therefore I am immortal.
Therefore I should anticipate never dying.
Therefore I should make plans that rely on never dying.
On the face of it, it seems sound. But after tabooing, we’re left with something like:
Our best, most parsimonious models of reality refer to unseen alternate universes and unseen persons psychologically continuous with each other.
In such models, alternate futures of a person-moment have no principled way of distinguishing one of themselves as “real”.
Therefore, our models of reality refer to arbitrarily long-lived versions of each person.
…
Therefore I have reason to anticipate never dying.
Therefore I have reason to act as if I will never die.
Edit: My #4 and #5 were nonsense.
I either don’t understand your re-write or don’t understand how it dissolves the argument.
Oh, I should have been more explicit: I think there’s a big logical leap between steps 3 and 4 of the rewritten argument, as indicated by the ellipsis. (Why is our models of reality referring to arbitrarily long-lived versions of each person a reason to act as if I will never die?) It’s far from clear that this gap can be bridged. That’s why I said the argument evaporates.