I agree it is extremely complex, but I don’t agree it completely misses what is actually going on.
You were earlier arguing that,
“The main issue I have is that, especially in the case of succession but in general too, I see that situations are often evaluated from some outside viewpoint which continues to be able to experience the situation rather than from the individual itself, which while necessary to stop the theorizing after the third sentence, isn’t what would ‘really happen’ down here in the real world.”
This implies you are certain that you will not experience anything after the individual you dies, yet you strongly believe that you will experience what future you will experience.
So it’s relevant to ask the question of, where do you draw the line between future you, vs. someone else? What if future you gets Alzheimer’s, and forgets 80% of your memories, making him no different than someone else? But then scientists invent a technology that cures aging (and Alzheimer’s), so future you lives a very long and wonderful life? Do you anticipate this person’s experiences?
Where do you draw the line? What if he forgets only 10% of your memories, or forgets 99.9% of your memories? What if someone completely separate from you, reads about your life, and delusionally believes that you are his past self? And gains 80% of your memories despite originally being someone else?
My opinion is that even if qualia in the present moment is more than an illusion, your decision for which qualia to anticipate in the future, is subjective. Any apparently objective rule for which qualia you should anticipate experiencing in the future, is an illusion. Any objective graph of consciousness (which dictates when each person’s consciousness should flow to his/her “future self,” and when each person’s consciousness “dies,”) starts to become nonsensical as soon as you consider these “edge cases” between future you and someone else.
What if future you gets Alzheimer’s, and forgets 80% of your memories, making him no different than someone else?
The answer to this is super straight forward; Do I continue experiencing qualia from the point of view of this future me? If yes, then absolutely nothing else matters, that’s me. If at some point during the Alzheimer’s I stop experiencing (permanently) then that isn’t me. If at some point after that I begin experiencing again, then whether or not ‘I’ died or was just unconscious is semantics. Memory doesn’t matter, the only thing that matters is the current experience I am having, as that is the only thing I can prove to exist.
If at some point during the Alzheimer’s I stop experiencing (permanently) then that isn’t me. If at some point after that I begin experiencing again, then whether or not ‘I’ died or was just unconscious is semantics.
When you say that dying vs. being unconscious is just semantics, that means you will experience future you’s qualia, even if he temporarily stops experiencing qualia, and loses 80% of your memories, right?
But what if future you loses 100% of your memories? Imagine it’s not just Alzheimer’s, but that the atoms of your brain are literally scrambled, and then rearranged to be identical to Obama’s brain. Would you continue to experience qualia, (with false memories of being Obama)?
If the answer is yes, then what if you literally die. But then the atoms of your dead body are absorbed by plants, which then get eaten by someone else, who gives birth to a baby. Now suppose this was done in a way most of your atoms eventually end up in this child as he grows up. Will you continue to experience his qualia?
The key question is, how badly do your atoms need to be scrambled, before the person they form no longer counts as “you,” and you won’t experience the qualia that he experiences? Do you agree that there is no objective answer? (And therefore, it’s not that unreasonable to anticipate experiences after death)
When you say that dying vs. being unconscious is just semantics, that means you will experience future you’s qualia, even if he temporarily stops experiencing qualia, and loses 80% of your memories, right?
To me, death is permanent loss, unconsciousness is temporary loss.
But what if future you loses 100% of your memories? Imagine it’s not just Alzheimer’s, but that the atoms of your brain are literally scrambled, and then rearranged to be identical to Obama’s brain. Would you continue to experience qualia, (with false memories of being Obama)?
No idea, that’s physics’s question, not philosophy. I think if it was a gradual process then probably, yeah, that’s basically what already happens.
get eaten by someone else, who gives birth to a baby. Now suppose this was done in a way most of your atoms eventually end up in this child as he grows up. Will you continue to experience his qualia?
Probably not, but if yes, but if there are no memories of my ‘past’ life it’s impossible for me to know if I had a previous set of memories.
The key question is, how badly do your atoms need to be scrambled, before the person they form no longer counts as “you,” and you won’t experience the qualia that he experiences? Do you agree that there is no objective answer?
Again, this is a physics question, not philosophy, but I believe there will some day be an objective answer to what’s going on with consciousness, I’m partial to naturalistic dualism or some sort of emergent property of algorithms in general, like IIT (Though IIT only says how it can be measured, not what it actually is?)
I suspect that IIT (and other theories of consciousness) will only say how conscious you are at a given moment. It won’t say whether or not that future person “really is you” or not, since that is subjective. It’s your choice which person in the future counts as “you.”
But anyways, I think we agree on one thing: it’s very uncertain whether or not you experience the qualia of someone else after you die. My opinion is that it’s completely subjective, your opinion is that it depends on physics and you don’t know, but we both agree that it’s complicated.
Given that it’s complicated, it seems like a very good hedge to care about what happens to humanity after you die. After all, the future may be full of great wonder so deep and long, that the present will seem relatively fleeting.
:) I thought your last comment admitted that you were quite uncertain whether “the experience of qualia will resume,” after you die and your atoms are eventually rearranged into other conscious beings.
I’m saying that if there’s a chance you will continue to experience the future, it’s worth caring about it.
I agree it is extremely complex, but I don’t agree it completely misses what is actually going on.
You were earlier arguing that,
This implies you are certain that you will not experience anything after the individual you dies, yet you strongly believe that you will experience what future you will experience.
So it’s relevant to ask the question of, where do you draw the line between future you, vs. someone else? What if future you gets Alzheimer’s, and forgets 80% of your memories, making him no different than someone else? But then scientists invent a technology that cures aging (and Alzheimer’s), so future you lives a very long and wonderful life? Do you anticipate this person’s experiences?
Where do you draw the line? What if he forgets only 10% of your memories, or forgets 99.9% of your memories? What if someone completely separate from you, reads about your life, and delusionally believes that you are his past self? And gains 80% of your memories despite originally being someone else?
My opinion is that even if qualia in the present moment is more than an illusion, your decision for which qualia to anticipate in the future, is subjective. Any apparently objective rule for which qualia you should anticipate experiencing in the future, is an illusion. Any objective graph of consciousness (which dictates when each person’s consciousness should flow to his/her “future self,” and when each person’s consciousness “dies,”) starts to become nonsensical as soon as you consider these “edge cases” between future you and someone else.
The answer to this is super straight forward; Do I continue experiencing qualia from the point of view of this future me? If yes, then absolutely nothing else matters, that’s me. If at some point during the Alzheimer’s I stop experiencing (permanently) then that isn’t me. If at some point after that I begin experiencing again, then whether or not ‘I’ died or was just unconscious is semantics. Memory doesn’t matter, the only thing that matters is the current experience I am having, as that is the only thing I can prove to exist.
When you say that dying vs. being unconscious is just semantics, that means you will experience future you’s qualia, even if he temporarily stops experiencing qualia, and loses 80% of your memories, right?
But what if future you loses 100% of your memories? Imagine it’s not just Alzheimer’s, but that the atoms of your brain are literally scrambled, and then rearranged to be identical to Obama’s brain. Would you continue to experience qualia, (with false memories of being Obama)?
If the answer is yes, then what if you literally die. But then the atoms of your dead body are absorbed by plants, which then get eaten by someone else, who gives birth to a baby. Now suppose this was done in a way most of your atoms eventually end up in this child as he grows up. Will you continue to experience his qualia?
The key question is, how badly do your atoms need to be scrambled, before the person they form no longer counts as “you,” and you won’t experience the qualia that he experiences? Do you agree that there is no objective answer? (And therefore, it’s not that unreasonable to anticipate experiences after death)
To me, death is permanent loss, unconsciousness is temporary loss.
No idea, that’s physics’s question, not philosophy. I think if it was a gradual process then probably, yeah, that’s basically what already happens.
Probably not, but if yes, but if there are no memories of my ‘past’ life it’s impossible for me to know if I had a previous set of memories.
Again, this is a physics question, not philosophy, but I believe there will some day be an objective answer to what’s going on with consciousness, I’m partial to naturalistic dualism or some sort of emergent property of algorithms in general, like IIT (Though IIT only says how it can be measured, not what it actually is?)
I suspect that IIT (and other theories of consciousness) will only say how conscious you are at a given moment. It won’t say whether or not that future person “really is you” or not, since that is subjective. It’s your choice which person in the future counts as “you.”
But anyways, I think we agree on one thing: it’s very uncertain whether or not you experience the qualia of someone else after you die. My opinion is that it’s completely subjective, your opinion is that it depends on physics and you don’t know, but we both agree that it’s complicated.
Given that it’s complicated, it seems like a very good hedge to care about what happens to humanity after you die. After all, the future may be full of great wonder so deep and long, that the present will seem relatively fleeting.
So? If I’m not there to experience it, and it can’t affect me in any way, it may as well not exist at all.
:) I thought your last comment admitted that you were quite uncertain whether “the experience of qualia will resume,” after you die and your atoms are eventually rearranged into other conscious beings.
I’m saying that if there’s a chance you will continue to experience the future, it’s worth caring about it.
If I come back, then I wasn’t dead to begin with, and I’ll start caring then. Until then, the odds are low enough that it doesn’t matter.