It would be interesting to know whether those without abstract imagined mental imagery are always non-dualists. I already strongly suspect that the intractability of the dualist/monist debate points to different types of minds. It’s not that monists understand dualists and disagree with them, it seems that often monists don’t even know what dualists are talking about*.
I further think there are different minds among dualists, because there doesn’t seem to be a consistent notion of what they mean by ‘qualia’.
*On the other hand, their sense of self may still interact with a simulation of reality, just one that isn’t image-based.
The visualisation (of abstract things) seems to be the important point; inability to interact with simulations of reality would preclude planning or memory, and would be pathological.
As a monist I think I understand the words uttered by dualists, and even the phenomena being described. What I do not know is why these things are perceived to be fundamental things. It does not bother me overmuch to recognise that my senses need not project out into the world. I will note that mathematics deals in the properties of unseen abstract things, which may make it easier to conceive of representations that aren’t fundamental in themselves.
It would be interesting to know whether those without abstract imagined mental imagery are always non-dualists. I already strongly suspect that the intractability of the dualist/monist debate points to different types of minds. It’s not that monists understand dualists and disagree with them, it seems that often monists don’t even know what dualists are talking about*.
I further think there are different minds among dualists, because there doesn’t seem to be a consistent notion of what they mean by ‘qualia’.
*On the other hand, their sense of self may still interact with a simulation of reality, just one that isn’t image-based.
The visualisation (of abstract things) seems to be the important point; inability to interact with simulations of reality would preclude planning or memory, and would be pathological.
As a monist I think I understand the words uttered by dualists, and even the phenomena being described. What I do not know is why these things are perceived to be fundamental things. It does not bother me overmuch to recognise that my senses need not project out into the world. I will note that mathematics deals in the properties of unseen abstract things, which may make it easier to conceive of representations that aren’t fundamental in themselves.