Searle asserts that Computationalism or Connectionism explicitly suggests that the mind and body are different, because if all a mind happens to be is a collection of symbols being computed, (or connections of patterns) then the mind would just be the program (or diagram of the patterns), and this could be written down on a hard copy.
Yet, Searle fails to take into account that the mind isn’t the hard copy, but it is only the hard copy of an instance of the program in operation.
Searle also denies that there can be multiple instances of the same mind (and, he is both right and wrong about that, but like most of his philosophy of mind, he really fails to follow through with his description of why this is the case).
Which led to my question: What am I if I am not the processes....
Now, if you are a dualist, which I was rather caught by… Then my reply is rather pointless.
Searle asserts that Computationalism or Connectionism explicitly suggests that the mind and body are different, because if all a mind happens to be is a collection of symbols being computed, (or connections of patterns) then the mind would just be the program (or diagram of the patterns), and this could be written down on a hard copy.
Yet, Searle fails to take into account that the mind isn’t the hard copy, but it is only the hard copy of an instance of the program in operation.
Searle also denies that there can be multiple instances of the same mind (and, he is both right and wrong about that, but like most of his philosophy of mind, he really fails to follow through with his description of why this is the case).
Which led to my question: What am I if I am not the processes....
Now, if you are a dualist, which I was rather caught by… Then my reply is rather pointless.