Maybe it does explain why we’re surprised about a personal friend winning the lottery—if we identify the “well-supported model” we were relying on.
Note, it need not be a model which is well-supported in terms of epistemic rationality. Merely that the model has been instrumentally useful: i.e. “my personal friend won’t become incredibly wealthy without warning.”
Alternatively, maybe it is worth considering different types of surprise which have some things in common but some differences.
Maybe it does explain why we’re surprised about a personal friend winning the lottery—if we identify the “well-supported model” we were relying on.
Note, it need not be a model which is well-supported in terms of epistemic rationality. Merely that the model has been instrumentally useful: i.e. “my personal friend won’t become incredibly wealthy without warning.”
Alternatively, maybe it is worth considering different types of surprise which have some things in common but some differences.