ETA: Correct me if I’m wrong, but a materialist of the first kind would be one who is open to the possibility of p-zombies.
No, p-zombies are supposed to be indistinguishable from the real thing. You can tell apart a simulation of consciousness from an actual conscious being, because the simulation is running on a different substrate.
Basically, yes. But I think it’s worthwhile to distinguish between physically (the original definition), functionally, and behaviorally identical p-zombies, where materialists reject the possibility of the first, and functionalists reject the first and second (each is obviously a superset of the former).
NB: “Functionally identical” is handwaving, absent some canonical method of figuring out what computation a physical system implements (the conscious-rocks argument).
No, p-zombies are supposed to be indistinguishable from the real thing. You can tell apart a simulation of consciousness from an actual conscious being, because the simulation is running on a different substrate.
Basically, yes. But I think it’s worthwhile to distinguish between physically (the original definition), functionally, and behaviorally identical p-zombies, where materialists reject the possibility of the first, and functionalists reject the first and second (each is obviously a superset of the former).
NB: “Functionally identical” is handwaving, absent some canonical method of figuring out what computation a physical system implements (the conscious-rocks argument).